Literature Homework Help


# Description Question
15606 jgjbk

Write a critical review of the video is essay format. Be sure to answer the following questions in your essay:


What are the main ideas from the video?

What is your overall opinion of the video? Do you agree with Khanna or not? Why? Explain with specific details.

What ideas from the video most interested you? why?


Video link:

Write a critical review of the video is essay format.

Analyze  various relevant film techniques use in the movie "Mulholland Drive" Directed by David Lynch. The conclusion of the story suggests a solution to the conflict that can be applied to the human condition in general. What values or principles that inform the actions of the characters can help people resolve their own life's conflicts?   Did the film strain to achieve an emotional pitch? Did it exhibit sentimentality for which there was little or no justification? Which scenes? How could this flaw have been remedied?  

**5 Pages - Double Spaced - MLA Format**

Similar to the last exam. Focus on demonstrating your knowledge on philosophy. No need of outside resources. Make a clear and strong argument and explain in details. Be sure to address all the questions in the prompt.


Prompt 1:

In “Responding to Skepticism” Keith DeRose presents a general skeptical argument for the conclusion that we do not know what we ordinarily think we know.  

Write a paper in which you explain the skeptical argument and why DeRose thinks that it is powerful. Then consider Moore’s response to the skeptical argument as presented by DeRose. Next, explain the contextualist response to the argument as presented by DeRose. Then take a position on this issue. If you find Moore’s response more plausible, then explain why, and raise and respond to at least one objection that a non-Moorian may raise. If you find contextualism more plausible, then explain why, and raise and respond to at least one objection that a non-contextualist may raise. If you find both responses to be problematic, then formulate your own position, and explain why it is better than the competitors.   


Make sure to:

1.Explain skeptical argument:

P1: You can’t prove it is not this situation (H)

P2: if it is this situation (H), you can’t know P

Therefore, you can’t be sure of P

-          why it is powerful? 1.Both premises are possibly true 2. The argument itself is valid, so the conclusion must be valid 3. In a valid


A parallel argument is

P1:If H, I cannot know P

P2:I know P

Therefore, I know not H


Two arguments are mutually exclusive


What is DeRose’s position?


2. Explain Moore


3. Explain/define contextualism: eg: Kansas is flat in a certain sense, but in other context, it is not that flat (compared to some states)


4. take a side

- why this side?

- raise objection to the side you chose then respond to it. Show why even you are aware of the objection, you still choose the side you chose. Descartes’s argument is an example of objection to this topic.




Prompt 2:

Read the excerpt from “My President was Black” by Ta-Nehisi Coates posted on Canvas. (If you are interested in the whole article, it is here: (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. ) On p. 10 Coates writes: “(…) Obama appealed to a belief in innocence – in particular a white innocence – that ascribed the country’s historical errors more to misunderstanding and the work of a small cabal than to any deliberate malevolence or widespread racism. America was good. America was great.”

Write a paper in which you explain what Coates means by this, and how (if at all) what he says in the article relates to Mills’ concept of “white ignorance”. To do this, explain what white ignorance is, and what role race plays in white ignorance, according to Mills. Then draw your own conclusions concerning whether the concept of white ignorance (a) helps explain what Coates is saying and; (b) sheds light on the concept of knowledge. If you think that the concept of white ignorance does shed light on knowledge, then explain what we can learn about knowledge by considering ignorance. If you think that it does not, then explain why.


1.Explain/define White Ignorance: related to epistemology. There is a history of depression, domination, dynamic of population. It’s a cognitive handicap that preventing you from seeing the truth. Eg. Columbus first arrives America, he thought the land is empty and nobody living. This cognition is preventing Columbus from the truth which the American land already had a human population and society.

2. Explain role of race in White Ignorance

1.Racism is what causes WI.

2.WI does not confine to just white people, people with other colors can also subject to WI. And it is not evenly distributed in white population. Race is a modern concept that is genetically inherited.  If you live in society with inequality, that is going to prevent you from seeing the truth.


3. Explain if the concept White Ignorance is useful in explaining Coates

-Why/why not

consider Obama’s popularity in white people


4. argue whether WI is useful to explain knowledge, generally. -Why/why not

                                                            It’s showing you there is something standing before seeing knowledge. If you live in a very oppressed, unequal society, you might need more justifications before you draw conclusion.

- raise objection to the side you chose then respond to it. Show why even you are aware of the objection, you still choose the side you chose.




1863 UTILITARIANISM John Stuart Mill



Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873) - English philosopher and economist who was a leading proponent of Utilitarianism and a supporter of women's suffrage.

Mill's best-known works were influenced by his wife, Harriet Taylor, to whom he attributed his understanding of the human side of his reforms. Utilitarianism (1863) - Utilitarianism was the term coined by Mill to state his doctrine that a right action is one that makes for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." This essay explicitly states his theory.



Table Of Contents

Chapter 1 General Remarks

Chapter 2

What Utilitarianism Is

Chapter 3

Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of-Utility

. 27

Chapter 4

Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible. 35

Chapter 5

On the Connection between Justice and Utility

. 4





Chapter 1

General Remarks

THERE ARE few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.

It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics; without much impairing, generally indeed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it.

The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For- besides that the existence of such- a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in disputethose believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in



the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority.

According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a priori principles which are to serve as the premises of the science; still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.

To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine.

It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable.

It is not my present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I cannot help referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: D So act, that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings. D But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All



he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.

On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.

We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, considered as one of philosophical theory.



Chapter 2

What Utilitarianism Is

A PASSING remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with anyone capable of so absurd a misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory Das impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility. D Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the omamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of omament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning.

Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, ifby doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation. 1

The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt's Annals of the Parish. After using it as a designation for several years, he and others abandoned it

from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one

single opinion, not a set of opinions- to denote the

recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it- the term supplies a want in the language, and

offers, in many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended



pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modem holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their



nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happinessthat the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior­confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher.

Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.



It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness.

But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct.

But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are



considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.

Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be? Next, they say, that men can do without happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue.

The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it well founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. Though, even in that case, something might still be said for the utilitarian theory; since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many, during some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost all.

The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end oflife, would be satisfied with such a moderate share of it.

But great numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less. The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. With much tranquillity, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure: with much excitement, many can



reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both; since the two are so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It is only those in whom indolence amounts to a vice, that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose: it is only those in whom the need of excitement is a disease, that feel the tranquillity which follows excitement dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable in direct proportion to the excitement which preceded it. When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind- I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties- finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their prospects in the future. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it; but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity.

Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these objects of contemplation, should not be the inheritance of every one bom in a civilised country. As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being should be a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which centre in his own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this is sufficiently common even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the public good, are possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought up human being. In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every one who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable; and unless such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find this enviable existence, if he escape the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering- such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape; which, as things now are, cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious influences; while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over



this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which cut short our own lives, but, what concerns us still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments connected with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions.

All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort; and though their removal is grievously slow- though a long succession of generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made- yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small and unconspicuous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent to be without.

And this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the objectors concerning the possibility, and the obligation, of learning to do without happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our present world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances of it: but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.

Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man. I will add, that in this condition the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising, such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him: which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end.

Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self



devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them, as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind.

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. If the, impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its, true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates.

The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with representing It III a discreditable light. On the contrary, those among them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested character, sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even ifhis object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.



But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed- of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial- it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition, is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals, for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society.

The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard of morality, and of the very meaning of the words right and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathising; that it chills their moral feelings towards individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the assertion means that they do not allow their judgment respecting the rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their opinion of the qualities of the person who does it, this is a complaint not against utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above all concern about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has everything; that he, and only he, is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blamable, often proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any particular case, it modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with



many people; but it is an unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards the distinction between right and wrong in a serious light; and the reproach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious to repel.

If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being lovable or admirable, this may be admitted.

Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake; and so do all other moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally available for them, namely, that, if there is to be any error, it is better that it should be on that side. As a matter of fact, we may affirm that among utilitarians as among adherents of other systems, there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of their standard: some are even puritanically rigorous, while others are as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist. But on the whole, a doctrine which brings prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the repression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law, is likely to be inferior to no other in turning the sanctions of opinion again such violations. It is true, the question, What does violate the moral law? is one on which those who recognise different standards of morality are likely now and then to differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not first introduced into the world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine does supply, if not always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelligible mode of deciding such differences.

It may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common misapprehensions of utilitarian ethics, even those which are so obvious and gross that it might appear impossible for any person of candour and intelligence to fall into them; since persons, even of considerable mental endowments, often give themselves so little trouble to understand the bearings of any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice, and men are in general so little conscious of this voluntary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the greatest pretensions both to high principle and to philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But others besides utilitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revelation was intended, and is fitted, to inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves what is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather than to tell them, except in a very general way, what it is; and that we need a doctrine of ethics, carefully followed out, to interpret to us the will God. Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any



given course of action, by as good a right as others can use it for the indication of a transcendental law, having no connection with usefulness or with happiness.

Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatised as an immoral doctrine by giving it the name of Expediency, and taking advantage of the popular use of that term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient, in the sense in which it is opposed to the Right, generally means that which is expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself; as when a minister sacrifices the interests of his country to keep himself in place. When it means anything better than this, it means that which is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher degree. The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the same thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than anyone thing that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendant expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognised, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.

Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such objections as this- that there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness. This is exactly as if anyone were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every occasion on which anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of life, are dependent. People talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness. Even then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling; but, at all events, the matter is now done to his hand.



It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion. There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short of that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. That philosophers might easily do this, even now, on many subjects; that the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right; and that mankind have still much to leam as to the effects of actions on the general happiness, I admit, or rather, earnestly maintain. The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on.

But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his. ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another. Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concemment. Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish. And this, as long as foresight is a human quality, it is to be presumed they will continue to do. Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against anyone in particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained till now, and always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy.

The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature, and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their course through life. We are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules, and, when under temptation, will see a utility in the breach of a rule, greater than he will see in its observance. But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil doing, and means of cheating our own conscience? They are afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of conflicting considerations; which all doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons. It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation



to peculiarities of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening thus made, self­deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome practically, with greater or with less success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be pretended that anyone will be the less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible.

Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at all: while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and unless determined, as they generally are, by the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognised.



Chapter 3

Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility

THE QUESTION is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard- What is its sanction? what are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question; which, though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory; and when a person is asked to believe that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox; the supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem; the superstructure seems to stand better without, than with, what is represented as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference? If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct, this difficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences- until, by the improvement of education, the feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures shall be (what it cannot be denied that Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character, and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person. In the meantime, however, the difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality and reduce it to principles; which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity.

The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals. Those sanctions are either external or internal. Of the external sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length. They are, the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure, from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do his will independently of selfish consequences. There is evidently no reason why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality, as completely and as powerfully as to any other. Indeed, those of them which refer to our fellow creatures are sure to do so, in proportion to the amount of general intelligence; for whether there be any other ground of moral obligation than the general happiness or not, men do desire happiness; and however imperfect may be their own practice, they desire and commend all conduct in others towards themselves, by which they think their happiness is promoted. With regard to the religious motive, if men believe, as most profess to do, in the goodness of God, those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence, or even only the criterion of good, must necessarily believe that it is also that which God approves. The whole force therefore of external reward and punishment, whether physical or moral, and whether proceeding from God or from our fellow men,



together with all that the capacities of human nature admit of disinterested devotion to either, become available to enforce the utilitarian morality, in proportion as that morality is recognised; and the more powerfully, the more the appliances of education and general cultivation are bent to the purpose.

So far as to external sanctions. The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same- a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience; though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement. This extreme complication is, I apprehend, the origin of the sort of mystical character which, by a tendency of the human mind of which there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation, and which leads people to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which, by a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present experience to excite it. Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it.

The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards- the conscientious feelings of mankind. Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist, a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved by experience. No reason has ever been shown why they may not be cultivated to as great intensity in connection with the utilitarian, as with any other rule of morals.

There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging to the province of DThings in themselves, D is likely to be more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, having its seat in human consciousness only. But whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, the force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength.

No one's belief that duty is an objective reality is stronger than the belief that God is so; yet the belief in God, apart from the expectation of actual reward and punishment, only operates on conduct through, and in proportion to, the subjective religious feeling. The sanction, so far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself; and the notion therefore of the transcendental moralists must be, that this sanction will not exist in the mind unless it is believed to have its root out of the mind; and that if a person is able to



say to himself, This which is restraining me, and which is called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind, he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and that if he find the feeling inconvenient, he may disregard it, and endeavour to get rid of it. But is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality? Does the belief that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind make the feeling of it too strong to be got rid of? The fact is so far otherwise, that all moralists admit and lament the ease with which, in the generality of minds, conscience can be silenced or stifled. The question, Need I obey my conscience? is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the principle of utility, as by its adherents.

Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question, if they answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they believe in the transcendental theory, but because of the external sanctions.

It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to decide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted. Assuming it to be innate, it is an open question to what objects it naturally attaches itself; for the philosophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that the intuitive perception is of principles of morality and not of the details. If there be anything innate in the matter, I see no reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains of others. If there is any principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory, I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further quarrel between them. Even as it is, the intuitive moralists, though they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations, do already believe this to one; for they unanimously hold that a large portion of morality turns upon the consideration due to the interests of our fellow­creatures.

Therefore, if the belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation gives any additional efficacy to the internal sanction, it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has already the benefit of it.

On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason the less natural. It is natural to man to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate the ground, though these are acquired faculties. The moral feelings are not indeed a part of our nature, in the sense of being in any perceptible degree present in all of us; but this, unhappily, is a fact admitted by those who believe the most strenuously in their transcendental origin.

Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it; capable, like them, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously; and susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of development. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction: so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these influences, be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience. To doubt that the same potency might be given by the same means to the principle of utility, even if it had no foundation in human nature, would be flying in the face of all experience.

But moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation, when intellectual culture goes on, yield by degrees to the dissolving force of analysis: and if the feeling of duty, when associated with utility, would appear equally arbitrary; if there were no leading



department of our nature, no powerful class of sentiments, with which that association would harmonise, which would make us feel it congenial, and incline us not only to foster it in others (for which we have abundant interested motives), but also to cherish it in ourselves; if there were not, in short, a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality, it might well happen that this association also, even after it had been implanted by education, might be analysed away.

But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society, becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human being.

Now, society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilisation, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, every one is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now, whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others; and even ifhe has none of it himself, he is as greatly interested as anyone else that others should have it. Consequently the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven round it, by the powerful agency of the external sanctions.

This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life, as civilisation goes on, is felt to be more and more natural. Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and levelling those inequalities of legal



privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard.

In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included. If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realise this conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality. To any ethical student who finds the realisation difficult, I recommend, as a means of facilitating it, the second of M. Comte's two principle works, the Traite de Politique Positive. I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise; but I think it has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion; making it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feeling, and action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste; and of which the danger is, not that it should be insufficient but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality.

Neither is it necessary to the feeling which constitutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognise it, to wait for those social influences which would make its obligation felt by mankind at large. In the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live, a person cannot indeed feel that entireness of sympathy with all others, which would make any real discordance in the general direction of their conduct in life impossible; but already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed, cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness, whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeed in his. The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures. If differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual feelings- perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings- he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict; that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for, namely their own good, but is, on the contrary, promoting it. This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether. But to those who have it, it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling. It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without. This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality. This it is which makes any mind, of well-developed feelings, work with, and not against, the outward motives to care for others, afforded by what I have called the external sanctions; and when those sanctions are wanting, or act in an opposite direction, constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force, in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character; since few but those whose mind is a moral blank, could bear to layout their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels.



Chapter 4

Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible

IT HAS already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct. But the former, being matters of fact, may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact- namely, our senses, and our internal consciousness. Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of practical ends? Or by what other faculty is cognisance taken of them? Questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable.

The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required of this doctrine- what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil- to make good its claim to be believed? The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.

But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation.

But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most



conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner- as a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue. This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the Happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, is to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness.

To illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may, then, be said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the great objects of human life- power, for example, or fame; except that to each of these there is a certain amount of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblance of being naturally inherent in them; a thing which cannot be said of money. Still, however, the strongest natural attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense aid they give to the attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong association thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass in strength all other desires. In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. And the utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their being so. Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity.



Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description.

There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness.

It results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for.

We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true- if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.

And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain; we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.

So obvious does this appear to me, that I expect it will hardly be disputed: and the objection made will be, not that desire can possibly be directed to anything ultimately except pleasure and exemption from pain, but that the will is a different thing from desire; that a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed,



carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in contemplating them, or expects to derive from their fulfilment; and persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much diminished, by changes in his character or decay of his passive sensibilities, or are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the purposes may bring upon him. All this I fully admit, and have stated it elsewhere, as positively and emphatically as anyone. Will, the active phenomenon, is a different thing from desire, the state of passive sensibility, and though originally an offshoot from it, may in time take root and detach itself from the parent stock; so much so, that in the case of an habitual purpose, instead of willing the thing because we desire it, we often desire it only because we will it. This, however, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is nowise confined to the case of virtuous actions. Many indifferent things, which men originally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from habit. Sometimes this is done unconsciously, the consciousness coming only after the action: at other times with conscious volition, but volition which has become habitual, and is put in operation by the force of habit, in opposition perhaps to the deliberate preference, as often happens with those who have contracted habits of vicious or hurtful indulgence.

Third and last comes the case in which the habitual act of will in the individual instance is not in contradiction to the general intention prevailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it; as in the case of the person of confirmed virtue, and of all who pursue deliberately and consistently any determinate end. The distinction between will and desire thus understood is an authentic and highly important psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this- that will, like all other parts of our constitution, is amenable to habit, and that we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself or desire only because we will it. It is not the less true that will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire; including in that term the repelling influence of pain as well as the attractive one of pleasure. Let us take into consideration, no longer the person who has a confirmed will to do right, but him in whom that virtuous will is still feeble, conquerable by temptation, and not to be fully relied on; by what means can it be strengthened? How can the will to be virtuous, where it does not exist in sufficient force, be implanted or awakened? Only by making the person desire virtue- by making him think of it in a pleasurable light, or of its absence in a painful one. It is by associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of either pleasure or pain. Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit. That which is the result of habit affords no presumption of being intrinsically good; and there would be no reason for wishing that the purpose of virtue should become independent of pleasure and pain, were it not that the influence of the pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy of action until it has acquired the support of habit. Both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts certainty; and it is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.

But if this doctrine be true, the principle of utility is proved. Whether it is so or not, must now be left to the consideration of the thoughtful reader.



Chapter 5

On the Connection between Justice and Utility

IN ALL ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of justice. The powerful sentiment, and apparently clear perception, which that word recalls with a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, have seemed to the majority of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things; to show that the just must have an existence in Nature as something absolute, generically distinct from every variety of the Expedient, and, in idea, opposed to it, though (as is commonly acknowledged) never, in the long run, disjoined from it in fact.

In the case of this, as of our other moral sentiments, there is no necessary connection between the question of its origin, and that of its binding force. That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature, does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings. The feeling of justice might be a peculiar instinct, and might yet require, like our other instincts, to be controlled and enlightened by a higher reason. If we have intellectual instincts, leading us to judge in a particular way, as well as animal instincts that prompt us to act in a particular way, there is no necessity that the former should be more infallible in their sphere than the latter in theirs: it may as well happen that wrong judgments are occasionally suggested by those, as wrong actions by these. But though it is one thing to believe that we have natural feelings of justice, and another to acknowledge them as an ultimate criterion of conduct, these two opinions are very closely connected in point of fact. Mankind are always predisposed to believe that any subjective feeling, not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of some objective reality. Our present object is to determine whether the reality, to which the feeling of justice corresponds, is one which needs any such special revelation; whether the justice or injustice of an action is a thing intrinsically peculiar, and distinct from all its other qualities, or only a combination of certain of those qualities, presented under a peculiar aspect.

For the purpose of this inquiry it is practically important to consider whether the feeling itself, of justice and injustice, is sui generis like our sensations of colour and taste, or a derivative feeling, formed by a combination of others. And this it is the more essential to examine, as people are in general willing enough to allow, that objectively the dictates of justice coincide with a part of the field of General Expediency; but inasmuch as the subjective mental feeling of justice is different from that which commonly attaches to simple expediency, and, except in the extreme cases of the latter, is far more imperative in its demands, people find it difficult to see, in justice, only a particular kind or branch of general utility, and think that its superior binding force requires a totally different ongm.

To throw light upon this question, it is necessary to attempt to ascertain what is the distinguishing character of justice, or of injustice: what is the quality, or whether there is any quality, attributed in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust (for justice, like many other moral attributes, is best defined by its opposite), and distinguishing them from such modes of conduct as are disapproved, but without having that particular epithet of disapprobation applied to them. If in everything which men are accustomed to characterise as just or unjust, some one common attribute or collection of attributes is always present, we may judge whether this particular attribute or



combination of attributes would be capable of gathering round it a sentiment of that peculiar character and intensity by virtue of the general laws of our emotional constitution, or whether the sentiment is inexplicable, and requires to be regarded as a special provision of Nature. If we find the former to be the case, we shall, in resolving this question, have resolved also the main problem: if the latter, we shall have to seek for some other mode of investigating it.

To find the common attributes of a variety of objects, it is necessary to begin by surveying the objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore advert successively to the various modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs, which are classed, by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust.

The things well known to excite the sentiments associated with those names are of a very multifarious character. I shall pass them rapidly in review, without studying any particular arrangement.

In the first place, it is mostly considered unjust to deprive anyone of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is just to respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights of anyone. But this judgment admits of several exceptions, arising from the other forms in which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves.

For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may (as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights which he is so deprived of: a case to which we shall return presently. But also, Secondly; the legal rights of which he is deprived, may be rights which ought not to have belonged to him; in other words, the law which confers on him these rights, may be a bad law. When it is so, or when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should only be shown in endeavouring to get it altered by competent authority. This opinion (which condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind, and would often protect pemicious institutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things existing at the time, have any chance of succeeding against them) is defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of expediency; principally on that of the importance, to the common interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly contrary opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may blamelessly be disobeyed, even though it be not judged to be unjust, but only inexpedient; while others would confine the licence of disobedience to the case of unjust laws: but again, some say, that all laws which are inexpedient are unjust; since every law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by tending to their good. Among these diversities of opinion, it seems to be universally admitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law, consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice, but may give to one person a benefit, or impose on another an evil, which justice condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.



Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. As it involves the notion of desert, the question arises, what constitutes desert? Speaking in a general way, a person is understood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in a more particular sense, to deserve good from those to whom he does or has done good, and evil from those to whom he does or has done evil. The precept of returning good for evil has never been regarded as a case of the fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are waived, in obedience to other considerations.

Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to break faith with anyone: to violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the other obligations of justice already spoken of, this one is not regarded as absolute, but as capable of being overruled by a stronger obligation of justice on the other side; or by such conduct on the part of the person concerned as is deemed to absolve us from our obligation to him, and to constitute a forfeiture of the benefit which he has been led to expect.

Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or preference to one person over another, in matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply. Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted that favour and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in which they are condemned are rather the exception than the rule. A person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for giving his family or friends no superiority in good offices over strangers, when he could do so without violating any other duty; and no one thinks it unjust to seek one person in preference to another as a friend, connection, or companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation of giving to every one his right. A tribunal, for example, must be impartial, because it is bound to award, without regard to any other consideration, a disputed object to the one of two parties who has the right to it. There are other cases in which impartiality means, being solely influenced by desert; as with those who, in the capacity of judges, preceptors, or parents, administer reward and punishment as such. There are cases, again, in which it means, being solely influenced by consideration for the public interest; as in making a selection among candidates for a government employment. Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting the solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would dictate.

Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality is that of equality; which often enters as a component part both into the conception of justice and into the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constitutes its essence. But in this, still more than in any other case, the notion of justice varies in different persons, and always conforms in its variations to their notion of utility. Each person maintains that equality is the dictate of justice, except where he thinks that expediency requires inequality. The justice of giving equal protection to the rights of all, is maintained by those who support the most outrageous inequality in the rights themselves.

Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted that the rights of the slave, such as they are, ought to be as sacred as those of the master; and that a tribunal which fails to enforce them with equal strictness is wanting in justice; while, at the same time,



institutions which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to enforce, are not deemed unjust, because they are not deemed inexpedient. Those who think that utility requires distinctions of rank, do not consider it unjust that riches and social privileges should be unequally dispensed; but those who think this inequality inexpedient, think it unjust also. Whoever thinks that govemment is necessary, sees no injustice in as much inequality as is constituted by giving to the magistrate powers not granted to other people. Even among those who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many questions of justice as there are differences of opinion about expediency. Some Communists consider it unjust that the produce of the labour of the community should be shared on any other principle than that of exact equality; others think it just that those should receive most whose wants are greatest; while others hold that those who work harder, or who produce more, or whose services are more valuable to the community, may justly claim a larger quota in the division of the produce. And the sense of natural justice may be plausibly appealed to in behalf of every one of these opinions.

Among so many diverse applications of the term justice, which yet is not regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the mental link which holds them together, and on which the moral sentiment adhering to the term essentially depends. Perhaps, in this embarrassment, some help may be derived from the history of the word, as indicated by its etymology.

In most, if not in all, languages, the etymology of the word which corresponds to Just, points distinctly to an origin connected with the ordinances of law. Justum is a form of jussum, that which has been ordered. Dikaion comes directly from dike, a suit at law. Recht, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with law. The courts of justice, the administration of justice, are the courts and the administration of law. La justice, in French, is the established term for judicature.

I am not committing the fallacy imputed with some show of truth to Home Tooke, of assuming that a word must still continue to mean what it originally meant. Etymology is slight evidence of what the idea now signified is, but the very best evidence of how it sprang up. There can, I think, be no doubt that the idee mere, the primitive element, in the formation of the notion of justice, was conformity to law. It constituted the entire idea among the Hebrews, up to the birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the case of a people whose laws attempted to embrace all subjects on which precepts were required, and who believed those laws to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being. But other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who knew that their laws had been made originally, and still continued to be made, by men, were not afraid to admit that those men might make bad laws; might do, by law, the same things, and from the same motives, which if done by individuals without the sanction oflaw, would be called unjust. And hence the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such laws as ought to exist, including such as ought to exist, but do not; and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be law. In this manner the idea of law and of its injunctions was still predominant in the notion of justice, even when the laws actually in force ceased to be accepted as the standard of it.

It is true that mankind consider the idea of justice and its obligations as applicable to many things which neither are, nor is it desired that they should be, regulated by law. Nobody desires that laws should interfere with the whole detail of private life; yet every one allows that in all daily conduct a person may and does show himself to be either just or unjust. But even here, the idea of the breach of what ought to be law, still lingers in a



modified shape. It would always give us pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should be punished, though we do not always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals. We forego that gratification on account of incidental inconveniences. We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and injustice repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, with reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power over individuals.

When we think that a person is bound in justice to do a thing, it is an ordinary form of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to do it. We should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anybody who had the power. If we see that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient, we lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity given to injustice as an evil, and strive to make amends for it by bringing a strong expression of our own and the public disapprobation to bear upon the offender. Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating idea of the notion of justice, though undergoing several transformations before that notion, as it exists in an advanced state of society, becomes complete.

The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and progressive growth of the idea of justice. But we must observe, that it contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellowcreatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.

It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How we come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment, will appear, perhaps, in the sequel; but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say, it would be right, to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it concems, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner. 2 This, therefore, being the characteristic difference which marks off, not justice, but morality in general, from the remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness; the character is still to be sought which distinguishes justice from other branches of morality. Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect obligation; the latter being those in which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the case of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor at any prescribed time. In the more precise language of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person



or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right. I think it will be found that this distinction exactly coincides with that which exists between jus-


See this point enforced and illustrated by Professor Bain, in

an admirable chapter (entitled DThe Ethical Emotions, or the Moral SenseD), of the second of the two treatises composing

his elaborate and profound work on the Mind.

tice and the other obligations of morality. In our survey of the various popular acceptations of justice, the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right- a claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law gives when it confers a proprietary or other legal right. Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two things- a wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than others; but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who are also assignable persons.

It seems to me that this feature in the case- a right in some person, correlative to the moral obligation- constitutes the specific difference between justice, and generosity or beneficence. Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual. And it will be found with respect to this, as to every correct definition, that the instances which seem to conflict with it are those which most confirm it.

For if a moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that mankind generally, though not any given individual, have a right to all the good we can do them, he at once, by that thesis, includes generosity and beneficence within the category of justice. He is obliged to say, that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow creatures, thus assimilating them to a debt; or that nothing less can be a sufficient return for what society does for us, thus classing the case as one of gratitute; both of which are acknowledged cases of justice. Wherever there is right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general, where we have now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality in justice.

Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinctive elements which enter into the composition of the idea of justice, we are ready to enter on the inquiry, whether the feeling, which accompanies the idea, is attached to it by a special dispensation of nature, or whether it could have grown up, by any known laws, out of the idea itself; and in particular, whether it can have originated in considerations of general expediency.

I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise from anything which would commonly, or correctly, be termed an idea of expediency; but that though the sentiment does not, whatever is moral in it does.

We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done.



Now it appears to me, that the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy.

It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done or attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathise. The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss. Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we know, common to all animal nature; for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt, or who it thinks are about to hurt, itself or its young. Human beings, on this point, only differ from other animals in two particulars. First, in being capable of sympathising, not solely with their offspring, or, like some of the more noble animals, with some superior animal who is kind to them, but with all human, and even with all sentient, beings. Secondly, in having a more developed intelligence, which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments, whether self-regarding or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence, even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own, and calls forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of self-defence. The same superiority of intelligence joined to the power of sympathising with human beings generally, enables him to attach himself to the collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind, in such a manner that any act hurtful to them, raises his instinct of sympathy, and urges him to resistance.

The sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements which consists of the desire to punish, is thus, I conceive, the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable to those injuries, that is, to those hurts, which wound us through, or in common with, society at large. This sentiment, in itself, has nothing moral in it; what is moral is, the exclusive subordination of it to the social sympathies, so as to wait on and obey their call. For the natural feeling would make us resent indiscriminately whatever anyone does that is disagreeable to us; but when moralised by the social feeling, it only acts in the directions conformable to the general good: just persons resenting a hurt to society, though not otherwise a hurt to themselves, and not resenting a hurt to themselves, however painful, unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of.

It is no objection against this doctrine to say, that when we feel our sentiment of justice outraged, we are not thinking of society at large, or of any collective interest, but only of the individual case. It is common enough certainly, though the reverse of commendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it- such a person, though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own. If he is not feeling this- if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually- he is not consciously just; he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions. This is admitted even by antiutilitarian moralists. When Kant (as before remarked) propounds as the fundamental principle of morals, D So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings, D he virtually acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively, or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. Otherwise he uses words without a



meaning: for, that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all rational beings- that there is any insuperable obstacle in the nature of things to its adoption- cannot be even plausibly maintained. To give any meaning to Kant's principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.

To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it.

And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathises, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar impressiveness, and energy of self-assertion.

I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated by the injury, not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements are, a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand, and a demand for punishment on the other. An examination of our own minds, I think, will show, that these two things include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it. If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by right, we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to chance, or to his own exertions. Thus, a person is said to have a right to what he can earn in fair professional competition; because society ought not to allow any other person to hinder him from endeavouring to eam in that manner as much as he can. But he has not a right to three hundred a-year, though he may happen to be eaming it; because society is not called on to provide that he shall earn that sum. On the contrary, if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent stock, he has a right to three hundred a­year; because society has come under an obligation to provide him with an income of that amount.

To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only, but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests. All other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can possibly do without on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all



and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. Now this most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and inexpediency. The feelings concerned are so powerful, and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested), that ought and should grow into must, and recognised indispensability becomes a moral necessity, analogous to physical, and often not inferior to it in binding force exhorted, If the preceding analysis, or something resembling it, be not the correct account of the notion of justice; if justice be totally independent of utility, and be a standard per se, which the mind can recognise by simple introspection of itself; it is hard to understand why that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and why so many things appear either just or unjust, according to the light in which they are regarded.

Weare continually informed that Utility is an uncertain standard, which every different person interprets differently, and that there is no safety but in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakable dictates of justice, which carry their evidence in themselves, and are independent of the fluctuations of opinion. One would suppose from this that on questions of justice there could be no controversy; that if we take that for our rule, its application to any given case could leave us in as little doubt as a mathematical demonstration. So far is this from being the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as much discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to society. Not only have different nations and individuals different notions of justice, but in the mind of one and the same individual, justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim, but many, which do not always coincide in their dictates, and in choosing between which, he is guided either by some extraneous standard, or by his own personal predilections.

For instance, there are some who say, that it is unjust to punish anyone for the sake of example to others; that punishment is just, only when intended for the good of the sufferer himself. Others maintain the extreme reverse, contending that to punish persons who have attained years of discretion, for their own benefit, is despotism and injustice, since if the matter at issue is solely their own good, no one has a right to control their own judgment of it; but that they may justly be punished to prevent evil to others, this being the exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence. Mr. Owen, again, affirms that it is unjust to punish at all; for the criminal did not make his own character; his education, and the circumstances which surrounded him, have made him a criminal, and for these he is not responsible. All these opinions are extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down to the principles which lie under justice and are the source of its authority, I am unable to see how any of these reasoners can be refuted. For in truth every one of the three builds upon rules of justice confessedly true. The first appeals to the acknowledged injustice of singling out an individual, and making a sacrifice, without his consent, for other people's benefit. The second relies on the acknowledged justice of self-defence, and the admitted injustice of forcing one person to conform to another's notions of what constitutes his good. The



Owenite invokes the admitted principle, that it is unjust to punish anyone for what he cannot help. Each is triumphant so long as he is not compelled to take into consideration any other maxims of justice than the one he has selected; but as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each disputant seems to have exactly as much to say for himself as the others. No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding.

These are difficulties; they have always been felt to be such; and many devices have been invented to tum rather than to overcome them. As a refuge from the last of the three, men imagined what they called the freedom of the will; fancying that they could not justify punishing a man whose will is in a thoroughly hateful state, unless it be supposed to have come into that state through no influence of anterior circumstances. To escape from the other difficulties, a favourite contrivance has been the fiction of a contract, whereby at some unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey the laws, and consented to be punished for any disobedience to them, thereby giving to their legislators the right, which it is assumed they would not otherwise have had, of punishing them, either for their own good or for that of society. This happy thought was considered to get rid of the whole difficulty, and to legitimate the infliction of punishment, in virtue of another received maxim of justice, Volenti non fit injuria; that is not unjust which is done with the consent of the person who is supposed to be hurt by it. I need hardly remark, that even if the consent were not a mere fiction, this maxim is not superior in authority to the others which it is brought in to supersede. It is, on the contrary, an instructive specimen of the loose and irregular manner in which supposed principles of justice grow up. This particular one evidently came into use as a help to the coarse exigencies of courts of law, which are sometimes obliged to be content with very uncertain presumptions, on account of the greater evils which would often arise from any attempt on their part to cut finer. But even courts of law are not able to adhere consistently to the maxim, for they allow voluntary engagements to be set aside on the ground of fraud, and sometimes on that of mere mistake or misinformation.

Again, when the legitimacy of inflicting punishment is admitted, how many conflicting conceptions of justice come to light in discussing the proper apportionment of punishments to offences. No rule on the subject recommends itself so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous sentiment of justice, as the lex talionis, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Though this principle of the Jewish and of the Mahometan law has been generally abandoned in Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I suspect, in most minds, a secret hankering after it; and when retribution accidentally falls on an offender in that precise shape, the general feeling of satisfaction evinced bears witness how natural is the sentiment to which this repayment in kind is acceptable. With many, the test of justice in penal infliction is that the punishment should be proportioned to the offence; meaning that it should be exactly measured by the moral guilt of the culprit (whatever be their standard for measuring moral guilt): the consideration, what amount of punishment is necessary to deter from the offence, having nothing to do with the question of justice, in their estimation: while there are others to whom that consideration is all in all; who maintain that it is not just, at least for man, to inflict on a fellow creature, whatever may be his offences, any amount of suffering beyond the least that will suffice to prevent him from repeating, and others from imitating, his misconduct.

To take another example from a subject already once referred to. In a co-operative industrial association, is it just or not that talent or skill should give a title to superior remuneration? On the negative side of the question it is argued, that whoever does the best he can, deserves equally well, and ought not in justice to be put in a position of



inferiority for no fault of his own; that superior abilities have already advantages more than enough, in the admiration they excite, the personal influence they cornmand, and the intemal sources of satisfaction attending them, without adding to these a superior share of the world's goods; and that society is bound in justice rather to make compensation to the less favoured, for this unmerited inequality of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side it is contended, that society receives more from the more efficient labourer; that his services being more useful, society owes him a larger return for them; that a greater share of the joint result is actually his work, and not to allow his claim to it is a kind of robbery; that if he is only to receive as much as others, he can only be justly required to produce as much, and to give a smaller amount of time and exertion, proportioned to his superior efficiency. Who shall decide between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice? justice has in this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony, and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is just that the cornmunity should give. Each, from his own point of view, is unanswerable; and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the preference.

How many, again, and how irreconcilable, are the standards of justice to which reference is made in discussing the repartition of taxation. One opinion is, that payment to the State should be in numerical proportion to pecuniary means.

Others think that justice dictates what they term graduated taxation; taking a higher percentage from those who have more to spare. In point of natural justice a strong case might be made for disregarding means altogether, and taking the same absolute sum (whenever it could be got) from every one: as the subscribers to a mess, or to a club, all pay the same sum for the same privileges, whether they can all equally afford it or not. Since the protection (it might be said) of law and government is afforded to, and is equally required by all, there is no injustice in making all buy it at the same price. It is reckoned justice, not injustice, that a dealer should charge to all customers the same price for the same article, not a price varying according to their means of payment. This doctrine, as applied to taxation, finds no advocates, because it conflicts so strongly with man's feelings of humanity and of social expediency; but the principle of justice which it invokes is as true and as binding as those which can be appealed to against it. Accordingly it exerts a tacit influence on the line of defence employed for other modes of assessing taxation. People feel obliged to argue that the State does more for the rich than for the poor, as a justification for its taking more from them: though this is in reality not true, for the rich would be far better able to protect themselves, in the absence of law or government, than the poor, and indeed would probably be successful in converting the poor into their slaves. Others, again, so far defer to the same conception of justice, as to maintain that all should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being of equal value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection of their property, which is unequal. To this others reply, that the all of one man is as valuable to him as the all of another. From these confusions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian.

Is, then the difference between the just and the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction? Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy, and that the latter ought only to be listened to after the former has been satisfied? By no means. The exposition we have given of the nature and origin of the sentiment, recognises a real distinction; and no one of those who profess the most



sublime contempt for the consequences of actions as an element in their morality, attaches more importance to the distinction than I do.

While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.

The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs. They have also the peculiarity, that they are the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of mankind. It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings: if obedience to them were not the rule, and disobedience the exception, every one would see in every one else an enemy, against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself. What is hardly less important, these are the precepts which mankind have the strongest and the most direct inducements for impressing upon one another. By merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they may gain, or think they gain, nothing: in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence they have an unmistakable interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the benefits of others; but he always needs that they should not do him hurt. Thus the moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed. It is by a person's observance of these that his fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings is tested and decided; for on that depends his being a nuisance or not to those with whom he is in contact.

Now it is these moralities primarily which compose the obligations of justice. The most marked cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to the feeling of repugnance which characterises the sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or wrongful exercise of power over some one; the next are those which consist in wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due; in both cases, inflicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of direct suffering, or of the privation of some good which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical or of a social kind, for counting upon.

The same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary moralities, enjoin the punishment of those who violate them; and as the impulses of self-defence, of defence of others, and of vengeance, are all called forth against such persons, retribution, or evil for evil, becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice, and is universally included in the idea. Good for good is also one of the dictates of justice; and this, though its social utility is evident, and though it carries with it a natural human feeling, has not at first sight that obvious connection with hurt or injury, which, existing in the most elementary cases of

just and unjust, is the source of the characteristic intensity of the sentiment. But the connection, though less obvious, is not less real. He who accepts benefits, and denies a return of them when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one of the most natural



and reasonable of expectations, and one which he must at least tacitly have encouraged, otherwise the benefits would seldom have been conferred. The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the hour of need; and few wrongs are greater than this mere withholding of good; none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in a sympathising spectator. The principle, therefore, of giving to each what they deserve, that is, good for good as well as evil for evil, is not only included within the idea of justice as we have defined it, but is a proper obj ect of that intensity of sentiment, which places the just, in human estimation, above the simply Expedient.

Most of the maxims of justice current in the world, and commonly appealed to in its transactions, are simply instrumental to carrying into effect the principles of justice which we have now spoken of. That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could voluntarily have avoided; that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard; that the punishment ought to be proportioned to

the offence, and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that justification.

The greater part of these common maxims have come into use from the practice of courts of justice, which have been naturally led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than was likely to suggest itself to others, of the rules necessary to enable them to fulfil their double function, of inflicting punishment when due, and of awarding to each person his right.

That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of justice, partly for the reason last mentioned; as being a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice. But this is not the only source of the exalted rank, among human obligations, of those maxims of equality and impartiality, which, both in popular estimation and in that of the most enlightened, are included among the precepts of justice. In one point of view, they may be considered as corollaries from the principles already laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for good as well as repressing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well of us, and that society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely. This is the highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible degree to converge.

But this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, D everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,D might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary. 3 The equal claim of everybody to happi-




This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian scheme, of perfect impartiality between persons, is regarded by Mr. Herbert Spencer (in his Social Statics) as a disproof of the pretensions of utility to be a sufficient guide to right; since (he says) the principle of utility presupposes the anterior principle, that everybody has an equal right to happiness. It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. This,

however, is not a pre-supposition; not a premise needful to support the principle of utility, but the very principle itself;

for what is the principle of utility, if it be not that

DhappinessD and DdesirableD are synonymous terms? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this,

that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities.[Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a private communication on the subject of the preceding Note, objects to being considered an opponent of utilitarianism, and states that he regards happiness as the

ultimate end of morality; but deems that end only partially attainable by empirical generalisations from the observed

results of conduct, and completely attainable only by deducing, from the laws oflife and the conditions of

existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. What the exception of the word Dnecessarily,D I have no dissent to express from this doctrine; and (omitting that word) I am not aware that any modem advocate of utilitarianism is of a

different opinion. Bentham, certainly, to whom in the Social Statics Mr. Spencer particularly referred, is, least of all

writers, chargeable with unwillingness to deduce the effect of actions on happiness from the laws of human nature and the universal conditions of human life. The common charge

against him is of relying too exclusively upon such

deductions, and declining altogether to be bound by the generalisations from specific experience which Mr. Spencer

thinks that utilitarians generally confine themselves to. My own opinion (and, as I collect, Mr. Spencer's) is, that in ethics, as in all other branches of scientific study, the

ness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of every individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits ought to be strictly construed. As every other maxim of justice, so this is by no means applied or held applicable universally; on the contrary, as I have already remarked, it bends to every person's ideas of social expediency. But in whatever case it is deemed applicable at all, it is held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have. been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to



condemn. The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity

consilience of the results of both these processes, each corroborating and verifying the other, is requisite to give to

any general proposition the kind degree of evidence which constitutes scientific proof.]

of social existence, has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatised injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex.

It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule anyone of the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.

The considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive, the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency: the difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as contradistinguished from the latter.

If this characteristic sentiment has been sufficiently accounted for; if there is no necessity to assume for it any peculiarity of origin; if it is simply the natural feeling of resentment, moralised by being made coextensive with the demands of social good; and if this feeling not only does but ought to exist in all the classes of cases to which the idea of justice corresponds; that idea no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics.

Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a class (though not more so than others may be in particular cases); and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions.




Utilitarianism: Mill

Mill provides both a theory of value and a

theory of right action.


Theory of value = account of what is of fundamental value, or of what is intrinsically good (Mill occasionally calls this a "theory of



Theory of right action = account of what makes actions good or bad.


(Connection = what makes an action good or bad is likely dependent on what is of intrinsic value.)

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Harriet Taylor (1807-1858)



Mill's Theory of Right Action

"A passing remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure." (p. 7)

Actions are right or good in so far as they promote utility.



What is Utility? Happiness

"Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with

exemption from pain;" (p. 7)


Greatest Happiness Principle:


"Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." (pp. 7-8)

So, when are actions right? Actions are right or good in so far as they promote happiness (pleasure and the absence of pain).



Whose happiness? The general happiness

Actions are right or good in proportion as they tend to promote happiness (they tend to promote pleasure and the absence of pain).

"that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether." (p. 10)

"I must again repeat that the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." (p.




Mill's Theory of Value

What is intrinsically good?

"pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and ( ... ) all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." (p. 8)

"The ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable - whether we are considering our own good or that of other people - is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments both in point of quantity and quality ( ... )" (pp. 10-11)

Pleasure (and freedom from pain) are intrinsically good and they are the only things that are intrinsically good.


Objection to Mill's Theory of Value

There are things that are good but not pleasurable. To think otherwise is to describe the life of swine (p. 8).

Reply: 1. By "pleasure", the utilitarian does not mean just the basic pleasures (pleasure is different from content). Intellectual pleasures are not just more durable, they are also qualitatively better. (pp. 8-11)

How do we tell what pleasures are qualitatively better?

We ask competent judges (people who have tried the different types of pleasure). (p. 8 -11)

2. What is at issue is the general happiness not the individual's happiness. If some virtues do not make the individual happy they may still make the general public happy. (p. 10)



The Martyr and the Hero

"Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our present world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances of it: but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? ( ... ) All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment oflife, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should." (p. 13)




Motives vs. Consequences

"They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations." (p. 14)



Worth of action vs. Worth of agent

"for certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions." (p. 15)

"[U tilitarians ] are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blamable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise." (p. 15)



Do motives matter to the morality of actions?

Two examples:


·              Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved him from drowning simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite tortures. Would it be right to speak of that rescue as a morally right action?

Suppose that a man betrayed a trust received from a friend, because the discharge of it would fatally injure that friend himself or someone belonging to him. Would utilitarianism call the betrayal 'a crime' as much as if it had been done from the meanest motive?


The tyrant's actions seem wrong in virtue of his motive. The man who betrays a trust deserves at least some exculpation in virtue of his motive.

What would (should) Mill say about these cases?



Utilitarianism: Mill

Mill's theory of right action = "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of

pleasure." (pp. 7-8)

Mill's theory of value = Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things that are desirable as ends. (p.


Pleasure and freedom from pain = Happiness.


So, happiness is the only thing that is desirable as an end.

F or Mill, being desirable as an end = being intrinsically good.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Harriet Taylor (1807-1858)



Theory of Value: Mill's Argument, first step

1. Just like in the case of a sound being audible, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable (as an end), is that people do actually desire it (as an end). (p. 25)

15.    People actually desire happiness (as an end).

3. So happiness is desirable as an end.

But, one's own happiness or the general




Theory of Value: Mill's Argument, second step

4.          Each person's happiness is a good to that person (p. 25).

The general happiness is an aggregate of each person's happiness.

6.          So the general happiness is an good to everybody.

So, the general happiness is desirable by everyone as an end.

But, is it the only end that is desirable? Do people ever desire anything else?



Theory of Value: Mill's Argument, third step

7.          The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable (as an end), is that people actually desire it (as an end) (p. 25)

8.          When people desire things other than (the general) happiness (virtue, money), they desire them as means to happiness or as part of happiness (pp. 26-27).

9.           The general happiness is the only thing desirable as an end.

"What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to attain it." (p. 26)




White Ignorance

Charles W Mills

White ignorance ...

It's a big subject. How much time do you have? It's not enough.

Ignorance is usually thought of as the passive obverse to knowledge,

the darkness retreating before the spread of Enlightenment.

But ...

Imagine an ignorance that resists. Imagine an ignorance that fights back.

Imagine an ignorance militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated,

an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly-

not at all confined to the illiterate and uneducated but propagated at the highest levels of the land, indeed presenting itself unblushingly as knowledge.


Classically individualist, indeed sometimes-self-parodically-to the verge of solipsism, blithely indifferent to the possible cognitive consequences of class, racial, or gender situatedness (or, perhaps more accurately, taking a propertied white male standpoint as given), modern mainstream Anglo­American epistemology was for hundreds of years from its Cartesian ori­gins profoundly inimical terrain for the developmen t of any concept of structural group-based miscognition. The paradigm exemplars of phe­nomena likely to foster mistaken belief-optical illusions, hallucinations, phantom limbs, dreams-were by their very banality universal to the human condition and the epistemic remedies prescribed-for example, rejecting all but the indubitable-correspondingly abstract and general.




Charles W Mills

Nineteenth-century Marxism, with its theoretical insistence on locating the individual agent and the individual cognizer in group (basically class) structures of domination, and its concepts of ideology, fetishism, societal "appearance," and divergent group (basically class) perspectives on the social order, offered a potential corrective to this epistemological individ­ualism. But to the extent that there was a mainstream twentieth-century appropriation of these ideas, in the form of Wissenssoziologie, the sociology of knowledge, it drew its genealogy from Karl Mannheim rather than Karl Marx, was frequently (despite terminological hedges such as Mannheim's "relationism") relativistic, and was in any case confined to sociology (Cur­tis and Petras 1970). So though some figures, such as Max Scheler and Mannheim himself, explicitly argued for the epistemological implications of their work, these claims were not engaged with by philosophers in the analytic tradition. A seemingly straightforward and clear-cut division of conceptual and disciplinary labor was presumed: descriptive issues of recording and explaining what and why people actually believed could be delegated to sociology, but evaluative issues of articulating cognitive norms would be reserved for (individualist) epistemology, which was philosophical territory.

But though mainstream philosophy and analytic epistemology con­tinued to develop in splendid isolation for many decades, W. V. Quine's naturalizing of epistemology would initiate a sequence of events with un­suspectedly subversive long-term theoretical repercussions for the field (Quine 1969b; Kornblith 1994b). If articulating the norms for ideal cog­nition required taking into account (in some way) the practices of actual cognition, if the prescriptive needed to pay attention (in some way) to the descriptive, then on what principled basis could cognitive realities of a supra-individual kind continue to be excluded from the ambit of episte­mology? For it then meant that the cognitive agent needed to be located in her specificity-as a member of certain social groups, within a given so­cial milieu, in a society at a particular time period. Whatever Quine's own sympathies (or lack thereof), his work had opened Pandora's box. A nat­uralized epistemology had, perforce, also to be a socialized epistemology; this was "a straightforward extension of the naturalistic approach" (Korn­blith 1994a, 93). What had originally been a specifically Marxist concept, "standpoint theory," was adopted and developed to its most sophisticated form in the work of feminist theorists (Harding 2004), and it became pos­sible for books with titles such as Social Epistemology (Fuller 2002) and So­cializing Epistemology (Schmitt 1994) and journals called Social Epistemolo[!:f to be published and seen (at least by some) as a legitimate part of phil os­ophy. The Marxist challenge thrown down a century before could now finally be taken up.


White Ignorance


Obviously, then, for those interested in pursuing such questions this is a far more welcoming environment than that of a few decades ago. Nonetheless, I think it is obvious that the potential of these developments for transforming mainstream epistemology is far from being fully real­ized. And at least one major reason for this failure is that the conceptions of society in the literature too often presuppose a degree of consent and inclusion that does not exist outside the imagination of mainstream schol­ars-in a sense, a societal population essentially generated by simple iter­ation ofthat originally solitary Cartesian cognizer. As Linda Martin Alcoff has ironically observed, the "society" about which these philosophers are writing often seems to be composed exclusively of white males (Alcoff 1996, 2, n. 1), so that one wonders how it reproduces itself. The Marxist critique is seemingly discredited, the feminist critique is marginalized, and the racial critique does not even exist. The concepts of domination, hegemony, ideology, mystification, exploitation, and so on that are part of the lingua franca of radicals find little or no place here. In particular, the analysis of the implications for social cognition of the legacy of white su­premacy has barely been initiated. The sole reference to race that I could find in the Schmitt (1994) collection, for example, was a single cautious sentence by Philip Kitcher (1994, 125), which I here reproduce in full:

"Membership of a particular ethnic group within a particular society may interfere with one's ability to acquire true beliefs about the distribution of characteristics that are believed to be important to human worth (witness the history of nineteenth-century craniometry)."

I sketch out in this chapter some of the features and the dynamic of what I see as a particularly pervasive-though hardly theorized-form of ignorance, what could be called white ignorance, linked to white su­premacy. (This chapter is thus an elaboration of one of the key themes of my 1997 book, The Racial Contract [Mills 1997].) The idea of group-based cognitive handicap is not an alien one to the radical tradition, if not nor­mally couched in terms of "ignorance." Indeed, it is, on the contrary, a straightforward corollary of standpoint theory: if one group is privileged, after all, it must be by comparison with another group that is handi­capped. In addition, the term has for me the virtue of signaling my theo­retical sympathies with what I know will seem to many a deplorably old-fashioned, "conservative," realist, intellectual framework, one in which truth, falsity, facts, reality, and so forth are not enclosed with ironic scare quotes. The phrase "white ignorance" implies the possibility of a contrasting "knowledge," a contrast that would be lost if all claims to truth were equally spurious, or just a matter of competing discourses. In the same way The Racial Contract was not meant as a trashing of contrac­tarianism, as such, but rather the demystification of a contractarianism



Charles W Mills

that ignored racial subordination, so similarly, mapping an epistemology of ignorance is for me a preliminary to reformulating an epistemology that will give us genuine knowledge.

The metatheoretical approach I find most congenial is that recently outlined by Alvin Goldman in his book Knowledge in a Social World (Gold­man 1999; see also Kornblith 1994a; Kitcher 1994). Goldman describes his project as "an essay in social veritistic epistemology," oriented "toward truth determination," as against contemporary poststructuralist or Kuhn­Feyerabend-Bloor-Barnes-inspired approaches that relativize truth (5). So though the focus is social rather than individual, the traditional con­cerns and assumptions of mainstream epistemology have been retained:

Traditional epistemology, especially in the Cartesian tradition, was highly individualistic, focusing on mental operations of cognitive agents in isolation or abstraction from other persons .... [This] indi­vidual epistemology needs a social counterpart: social epistemology .... In what respects is social epistemology social? First, it focuses on social paths or routes to knowledge. That is, considering believers taken one at a time, it looks at the many routes to belief that feature interactions with other agents, as contrasted with private or asocial routes to belief acquisition .... Second, social epistemology does not restrict itself to believers taken singly. It often focuses on some sort of group entity ... and examines the spread of information or misinformation across that group's membership. Rather than concentrate on a single knower, as did Cartesian epistemology, it addresses the distribution of knowledge or error within the larger social cluster. ... Veritistic epistemology (whether individual or social) is concerned with the production of knowledge, where knowledge is here understood in the "weak" sense of true belief More precisely, it is concerned with both knowledge and its contraries: error (false belief) and ignorance (the absence of true be­lief). The main question for veritistic epistemology is: Which practices have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance? Individual veritistic epistemology asks this question for nonsocial practices; social veri tis tic epistemology asks it for social practices. (Goldman 1999,4-5, emphasis in original)

Unlike Goldman, I will use ignorance to cover both false belief and the absence of true belief. But with this minor terminological variation, this is basically the project I am trying to undertake: looking at the "spread of misinformation," the "distribution of error" (including the possibility of "massive error" [Kornblith 1994a, 97]), within the "larger social cluster," the "group entity," of whites, and the "social practices" (some "wholly pernicious" [Kornblith 1994a, 97]) that encourage it. Goldman makes glancing reference to some of the feminist and race lit­erature (there is a grand total of a single index entry for racism), but in


White Ignorance


general the implications of systemic social oppression for his project are not addressed. The picture of "society" he is working with is one that­with perhaps a few unfortunate exceptions-is inclusive and harmo­nious. Thus his account offers the equivalent in social epistemology of the mainstream theorizing in political science that frames American sex­ism and racism as "anomalies": u.s. political culture is conceptualized as essentially egalitarian and inclusive, with the long actual history of sys­temic gender and racial subordination being relegated to the status of a minor "deviation" from the norm (Smith 1997). Obviously such a start­ing point crucially handicaps any realistic social epistemology, since in ef­fect it turns things upside down. Sexism and racism, patriarchy and white supremacy, have not been the exception but the norm. So though his book is valuable in terms of conceptual clarification, and some illuminating discussions of particular topics, the basic framework is flawed insofar as it marginalizes domination and its consequences. A less naive understand­ing of how society actually works requires drawing on the radical tradi­tion of social theory, in which various factors he does not consider playa crucial role in obstructing the mission of veri tis tic epistemology.


Let me turn now to race. As I pointed out in an article more than fifteen years ago (Mills 1998), and as has unfortunately hardly changed since then, there is no academic philosophical literature on racial epistemology that remotely compares in volume to that on gender epistemology. (Race and gender are not, of course, mutually exclusive, but usually in gender theory it is the perspective of white women that is explored.) However, one needs to distinguish academic from lay treatments. I would suggest that "white ignorance" has, whether centrally or secondarily, been a theme of many of the classic fictional and nonfictional works of the African American experience, and also that of other people of color. In his introduction to a collection of black writers' perspectives on white­ness, David Roediger (1998) underlines the fundamental epistemic asym­metry between typical white views of blacks and typical black views of whites: these are not cognizers linked by a reciprocal ignorance but rather groups whose respective privilege and subordination tend to produce self­deception, bad faith, evasion, and misrepresentation, on the one hand, and more veridical perceptions, on the other hand. Thus he cites James Weldon Johnson's remark "colored people of this country know and un­derstand the white people better than the white people know and under­stand them" (5). Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay anthropologists, studying the strange culture, customs, and mind-set of the "white tribe" that has such frightening power over them,



Charles W Mills

that in certain time periods can even determine their life or death on a whim. (In particular circumstances, then, white ignorance may need to be actively encouraged, thus the black American folk poem, "Got one mind for white folks to see/Another for what I know is me," or, inJames Baldwin's brutally candid assessment, "I have spent most of my life, after all, watch­ing white people and outwitting them, so that I might survive" [Baldwin 1993, 217].) What people of color quickly come to see-in a sense, the primary epistemic principle of the racialized social epistemology of which they are the object-is that they are not seen at all. Thus the "central metaphor" ofW. E. B. Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk is the image of the "veil" (Gibson 1989, xi), and the black American cognitive equivalent of the shocking moment of Cartesian realization of the uncertainty of every­thing one had taken to be knowledge is the moment when, for Du Bois, as a child in New England, "It dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their [white] world by a vast veil" (Du Bois 1989,4).

Similarly, Ralph Ellison's classic Invisible Man (1995), generally regarded as the most important twentieth-century novel ofthe black expe­rience, is arguably, in key respects-while a multidimensional and multi­layered work of great depth and complexity, not to be reduced to a single theme-an epistemological novel. For what it recounts is the protagonist's quest to determine what norms of belief are the right ones in a crazy look­ing-glass world where he is an invisible man "simply because [white] peo­ple refuse to see me .... When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-indeed, everything and anything except me." And this systematic misperception is not, of course, due to biology, the intrinsic properties of his epidermis or physical deficiencies in the white eye but rather to "the construction of their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality" (3). The images oflight and darkness, sight and blind­ness, that run through the novel, from the blindfolded black fighters in the grotesque battle royal at the start to the climactic discovery that the Brotherhood's (read: American Communist Party) leader has a glass eye, repeatedly raise, in context after context, the question of how one can de­marcate what is genuine from only apparent insight, real from onlyappar­ent truth, even in the worldview of those whose historical materialist "science" supposedly gave them "super vision."

Nor is it only black writers who have explored the theme of white ig­norance. One of the consequences of the development of critical white studies has been a renewed appreciation of the pioneering work of Her­man Melville, with Moby Dick (2000) now being read by some critics as an early nineteenth-century indictment ofthe national obsession with white-


White Ignorance


ness, Ahab's pathological determination to pursue the white whale re­gardless of its imperilment of his multiracial crew. But it is in the 1856 short novel Benito Cereno (1986)-used as the source of one of the two epigraphs to Invisible Man by Ellison-that one finds the most focused in­vestigation of the unnerving possibilities of white blindness. Boarding a slave ship-the San Dominick, a reference to the Haitian Revolution­which, unknown to the protagonist, Amasa Delano, has been taken over by its human cargo, with the white crew being held hostage, Delano has all around him the evidence for black insurrection, from the terror in the eyes of the nominal white captain, the eponymous Benito Cereno, as his black barber Babo puts the razor to his throat, to the Africans clash­ing their hatchets ominously in the background. But so unthinkable is the idea that the inferior blacks could have accomplished such a thing that Delano searches for every possible alternative explanation for the seemingly strange behavior of the imprisoned whites, no matter how far­fetched. In Eric Sundquist's summary (1993):

Melville's account of the "enchantment" of Delano, then, is also a means to examine the mystifications by which slavery was maintained .... Minstrelsy-in effect, the complete show of the tale's action staged for Delano-is a product, as it were, of his mind, of his willingness to accept

        Babo's Sambo-like performance ........... Paradoxically, Delano watches Babo's

        performance without ever seeing it .............. Delano participates in a continued

act of suppressed revolt against belief in the appearances presented to him ... raj self-regulation by racist assumptions and blind "innocence." (151-55,171)

The white delusion of racial superiority insulates itself against refuta­tion. Correspondingly, on the positive epistemic side, the route to black knowledge is the self-conscious recognition of white ignorance (including its black-faced manifestation in black consciousness itself). Du Bois's (1989) famous and oft-cited figure of "double consciousness" has been var­iously interpreted, but certainly one plausible way of reading it is as a pre­scription for a critical cognitive distancing from "a world which yields [the Negro] no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world," a "sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others" (5). The attainment of "second sight" requires an understanding of what it is about whites and the white situation that motivates them to view blacks erroneously. One learns to see through iden­tifying white blindness and avoiding the pitfalls of putting on these specta­cles for one's own vision.

This subject is by no means unexplored in white and black texts, but as noted, because of the whiteness of philosophy, very little has been done here. (One exception is Lewis Gordon's [1995] work on bad faith,



Charles W Mills

which is obviously relevant to this subject, though not itself set in a for­mal epistemological framework.) In this chapter, accordingly, I gesture toward some useful directions for mapping white ignorance and devel­oping, accordingly, epistemic criteria for minimizing it.


What I want to pin down, then, is the idea of an ignorance, a non-know­ing, that is not contingent, but in which race-white racism and/ or white racial domination and their ramifications-plays a crucial causal role. Let me begin by trying to clarity and demarcate more precisely the phe­nomenon I am addressing, as well as answering some possible objections. To begin with, white ignorance as a cognitive phenomenon has to be clearly historicized. I am taking for granted the truth of some variant of social constructivism, which denies that race is biological. So the causal­ity in the mechanisms for generating and sustaining white ignorance on the macro level is social-structural rather than physico-biological, though it will of course operate through the physico-biological. Assuming that the growing consensus in critical race theory is correct-that race in gen­eral, and whiteness in particular, is a product of the modern period (Fredrickson 2002)-then you could not have had white ignorance in this technical, term-of-art sense in, say, the ancient world, because whites did not exist then. Certainly people existed who by today's standards would be counted as white, but they would not have been so categorized at the time, either by themselves or others, so there would have been no whiteness to playa causal role in their knowing or non-knowing. More­over, even in the modern period, whiteness would not have been univer­sally, instantly, and homogeneously instantiated; there would have been (to borrow an image from another field of study) "uneven development" in the processes of racialization in different countries at different times. Indeed, even in the United States, in a sense the paradigm white su­premacist state, Matthew Frye Jacobson (1998) argues for a periodization of whiteness into different epochs, with some European ethnic groups only becoming fully white at a comparatively late stage.

Second, one would obviously need to distinguish what I am calling white ignorance from general patterns of ignorance prevalent among people who are white but in whose doxastic states race has played no de­termining role. For example, at all times (such as right now) there will be many facts about the natural and social worlds on which people, includ­ing white people, have no opinion, or a mistaken opinion, but race is not directly or indirectly responsible, for instance, the number of planets 200 years ago, the exact temperature in the earth's crust twenty miles down right now, the precise income distribution in the United States, and so


White Ignorance


forth. But we would not want to call this white ignorance, even when it is shared by whites, because race has not been responsible for these non­knowings, but other factors.

Third (complicating the foregoing), it needs to be realized that once indirect causation and diminishing degrees of influence are ad­mitted, it will sometimes be very difficult to adjudicate when specific kinds of non-knowing are appropriately categorizable as white igno­rance or not. Recourse to counterfactuals of greater or lesser distance from the actual situation may be necessary ("what they should and would have known if ... "), whose evaluation may be too complex to be resolvable. Suppose, for example, that a particular true scientific gener­alization about human beings, P, would be easily discoverable in a soci­ety were it not for widespread white racism, and that with additional research in the appropriate areas, P could be shown to have further im­plications, Q, and beyond that, R. Or, suppose that the practical appli­cation of Pin medicine would have had as a spin-off empirical findings PI' P2' P3· Should these related principles and factual findings all be in­cluded as examples of white ignorance as well? How far onward up the chain? And so forth. So it will be easy to think up all kinds of tricky cases where it will be hard to make the determination. But the existence of such problematic cases at the borders does not undermine the import of more central cases.

Fourth, the racialized causality I am invoking needs to be expansive enough to include both straightforward racist motivation and more im­personal social-structural causation, which may be operative even if the cognizer in question is not racist. It is necessary to distinguish the two not merely as a logical point, because they are analytically separable, but be­cause in empirical reality they may often be found independently of each other. You can have white racism, in particular white cognizers, in the sense of the existence of prejudicial beliefs about people of color without (at that time and place) white domination ofthose people of color having been established; and you can also have white domination of people of color at a particular time and place without all white cognizers at that time and place being racist. But in both cases, racialized causality can give rise to what I am calling white ignorance, straightforwardly for a racist cognizer, but also indirectly for a nonracist cognizer who may form mis­taken beliefs (e.g., that after the abolition of slavery in the United States, blacks generally had opportunities equal to whites) because of the social suppression of the pertinent knowledge, though without prejudice him­self. So white ignorance need not always be based on bad faith. Obviously from the point of view of a social epistemology, especially after the transi­tion from de jure to de facto white supremacy, it is precisely this kind of white ignorance that is most important.



Charles W Mills

Fifth, the "white" in "white ignorance" does not mean that it has to be confined to white people. Indeed, as the earlier Du Bois discussion emphasized, it will often be shared by nonwhites to a greater or lesser ex­tent because of the power relations and patterns of ideological hege­mony involved. (This is a familiar point from the Marxist and feminist traditions-working-class conservatives, "male-identified" women, en­dorsing right-wing and sexist ideologies against their interests.) Provid­ing that the causal route is appropriate, blacks can manifest white ignorance also.

Sixth, and somewhat different, white racial ignorance can produce a doxastic environment in which particular varieties of black racial igno­rance flourish-so that racial causality is involved-but which one would hesitate to subsume under the category "white ignorance" itself, at least without significant qualification. Think, for example, of "oppositional" African American varieties of biological and theological determinism: whites as melanin deficient and therefore inherently physiologically and psychologically flawed, or whites as "blue-eyed devils" created by the evil scientist Yacub (as in early Black Muslim theology). Insofar as these theo­ries invert claims of white racial superiority, though still accepting racial hierarchy, they would seem to be deserving of a separate category, though obviously they have been shaped by key assumptions of "scientific" and theological white racism.

Seventh, though the examples I have given so far have all been fac­tual ones, I want a concept of white ignorance broad enough to include moral ignorance-not merely ignorance of facts with moral implications but moral non-knowings, incorrect judgments about the rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves. For me, the epistemic desidera­tum is that the naturalizing and socializing of epistemology should have, as a component, the naturalizing and socializing of moral epistemology also (Campbell and Hunter 2000) and the study of pervasive social pat­terns of mistaken moral cognition. Thus the idea is that improvements in our cognitive practice should have a practical payoff in heightened sen­sitivity to social oppression and the attempt to reduce and ultimately eliminate that oppression.

Eighth, it presumably does not need to be emphasized that white ig­norance is not the only kind of privileged, group-based ignorance. Male ignorance could be analyzed similarly and clearly has a far more ancient history and arguably a more deep-rooted ancestry in human interrela­tions, insofar as it goes back thousands of years. I am focusing on white ignorance because, as mentioned, it has been relatively undertheorized in the white academy compared to the work of feminist theorists.

Ninth, speaking generally about white ignorance does not commit one to the claim that it is uniform across the white population. Whites


White Ignorance


are not a monolith, and if the analysis of white ignorance is to be part of a social epistemology, then the obvious needs to be remembered-that people have other identities beside racial ones, so that whites will be di­visible by class, gender, nationality, religion, and so forth, and these fac­tors will modify, by differential socialization and experience, the bodies of belief and the cognitive patterns of the subpopulations concerned. But this is, of course, true for all sociological generalizations, which has never been a reason for abandoning them but of employing them cau­tiously. White ignorance is not indefeasible (even if it sometimes seems that way!) , and some people who are white will, because of their particu­lar histories (and/or the intersection of whiteness with other identities), overcome it and have true beliefs on what their fellow whites get wrong. So white ignorance is best thought of as a cognitive tendency-an incli­nation, a doxastic disposition-which is not insuperable. If there is a so­ciology of knowledge, then there should also be a sociology of ignorance.

Tenth, and finally, the point of trying to understand white ignorance is, of course, normative and not merely sociological-hence the emphasis on the continuity with classic epistemology-the goal of trying to reduce or eliminate it. In classic individualist epistemology, one seeks not merely to eliminate false belief but to develop an understanding, wariness, and avoidance of the cognitive processes that typically produce false belief. For a social epistemology, where the focus is on supra-individual processes, and the individual's interaction with them, the aim is to understand how certain social structures tend to promote these crucially flawed processes, how to personally extricate oneself from them (insofar as that is possible), and to do one's part in undermining them in the broader cog­nitive sphere. So the idea is that there are typical ways of going wrong that need to be adverted to in light of the social structure and specific group characteristics, and one has a better chance of getting things right through a self-conscious recognition of their existence, and corresponding self­distancing from them.


Let us turn now to the processes of cognition, individual and social, and the examination of the ways in which race may affect some of their cru­cial components. As examples, I will look at perception, conception, memory, testimony, and motivational group interest (in a longer treat­ment, differential group experience should also be included). Separat­ing these various components is difficult because they are all constantly in interaction with one another. For example, when the individual cog­nizing agent is perceiving, he is doing so with eyes and ears that have been socialized. Perception is also in part conception, the viewing of the



Charles W Mills

world through a particular conceptual grid. Inference from perception involves the overt or tacit appeal to memory, which will be not merely individual but social. As such, it will be founded on testimony and ulti­matelyon the perceptions and conceptions of others. The background knowledge that will guide inference and judgment, eliminating (puta­tively) absurd alternatives and narrowing down a set of plausible con­tenders, will also be shaped by testimony, or the lack thereof, and will itself be embedded in various conceptual frameworks and require per­ception and memory to access. Testimony will have been recorded, re­quiring again perception, conception, and memory; it will have been integrated into a framework and narrative and from the start will have in­volved the selection of certain voices as against others, selection in and selection out (if these others have been allowed to speak in the first place). At all levels, interests may shape cognition, influencing what and how we see, what we and society choose to remember, whose testimony is solicited and whose is not, and which facts and frameworks are sought out and accepted. Thus at any given stage it is obvious that an interaction of great complexity is involved, in which multiple factors will be affecting one another in intricate feedback loops of various kinds. So an analytic separation of elements for conceptual isolation and clarification will nec­essarily be artificial, and in a sense each element so extracted bears a ghostly trail of all the others in its wake.

Start with perception. A central theme of the epistemology of the past few decades has been the discrediting of the idea of a raw perceptual "given," completely unmediated by concepts. Perceptions are in general simultaneously conceptions, if only at a very low level. Moreover, the so­cial dimension of epistemology is obviously most salient here, since in­dividuals do not in general make up these categories themselves but inherit them from their cultural milieu. "The influence of social factors begins at birth, for language is not reinvented by each individual in social isolation, nor could it be. Because language acquisition is socially medi­ated, the concepts we acquire are themselves socially mediated from the very beginning" (Kornblith 1994a, 97). But this means that the concep­tual array with which the cognizer approaches the world needs itself to be scrutinized for its adequacy to the world, for how well it maps the re­ality it claims to be describing. In addition, it is not a matter of monadic predicates, reciprocally isolated from one another, but concepts linked by interlocking assumptions and background belief sets into certain com­plexes of ideation that by their very nature tend to put a certain inter­pretation on the world. So in most cases the concepts will not be neutral but oriented toward a certain understanding, embedded in subtheories and larger theories about how things work.


White Ignorance


In the orthodox left tradition, this set of issues is handled through the category "ideology"; in more recent radical theory, through Fou­cault's "discourses." But whatever one's larger metatheoretical sym­pathies, whatever approach one thinks best for investigating these ideational matters, such concerns obviously need to be part of a social epistemology. For if the society is one structured by relations of domina­tion and subordination (as of course most societies in human history have been), then in certain areas this conceptual apparatus is likely going to be shaped and inflected in various ways by the biases of the rul­ing group(s). So crucial concepts may well be misleading in their inner makeup and their external relation to a larger doxastic architecture. Moreover, what cognitive psychology has revealed is that rather than con­tinually challenging conceptual adequacy by the test of disconfirm­ing empirical data, we tend to do the opposite-to interpret the data through the grid of the concepts in such a way that seemingly disc on­firming, or at least problematic, perceptions are filtered out or margin­alized. In other words, one will tend to find the confirmation in the world whether it is there or not.

Now apply this to race: consider the epistemic principle of what has come to be called "white normativity," the centering of the Euro and later Euro-American reference group as constitutive norm. Ethnocen­trism is, of course, a negative cognitive tendency common to all peoples, not just Europeans. But with Europe's gradual rise to global domination, the European variant becomes entrenched as an overarching, virtually unassailable framework, a conviction of exceptionalism and superiority that seems vindicated by the facts, and thenceforth, circularly, shaping perception of the facts. We rule the world because we are superior; we are superior because we rule the world. In his pioneering 1950s' essays against Eurocentrism, world historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson (1993b) invokes Saul Steinberg's famous March 29, 1976, New Yorker cover car­toon depiction ofthe "View ofthe World from 9th Avenue," the bizarrely foreshortened view of the United States afforded from the Upper East Side and argues that the standard geographical representations of Eu­rope by Europeans, as in the Mercator projection world map, are not really that radically different:

It would be a significant story in itself to trace how modern Westerners have managed to preserve some of the most characteristic features of their ethnocentric medieval image of the world. Recast in modern scientific and scholarly language, the image is still with us .... The point of any ethnocentric world image is to divide the world into moieties, ourselves and the others, ourselves forming the more important of the two .... We divide the world into what we call "continents." ... Why is



Charles W Mills

Europe one of the continents but not India? ... Europe is still ranked as one of the "continents" because our cultural ancestors lived there. By making it a "continent," we give it a rank disproportionate to its natural size, as a subordinate part of no larger unit, but in itself one of the major component parts of the world .... (I call such a world map the 'Jim Crow projection" because it shows Europe as larger than Africa.) [Mercator] confirms our predispositions. (3-5)

This geographical misrepresentation and regional inflation have gone in tandem with a corresponding historical misrepresentation and inflation. Criticizing the standard historical categories of Western histo­rians, Hodgson suggests that "the very terms we allow ourselves to use fos­ter distortion." The "convenient result" is that Europe, an originally peripheral region of what Hodgson calls the "Afro-Eurasian historical complex," is lifted out of its context and elevated into a self-creating en­tity unto itself, "an independent division of the whole world, with a his­tory that need not be integrated with that of the rest of mankind save on the terms posed by European history itself' (9).

From this fatally skewed optic, of course, stem all those theories of innate European superiority to the rest of the world that are still with us today but in modified and subtler versions. Whiteness is originally coexten­sive with full humanity, so that the nonwhite Other is grasped through a his­toric array of concepts whose common denominator is their subjects' location on a lower ontological and moral rung.

Consider, for example, the category of the "savage" and its concep­tual role in the justification of imperialism. As Francis Jennings (1976) points out, the word was "created for the purposes of conquest rather than the purposes of knowledge. " "Savagery" and "civilization"were "rec­iprocals" and were "both independent of any necessary correlation with empirical reality." The conceptual outcome was a "conjoined myth" that "greatly distorted [white] Americans' perceptions of reality," necessarily involving "the suppression offacts" (12, 10). In effect,

the Englishman devised the savage's form to fit his function. The word savage thus underwent considerable alteration of meaning as different colonists pursued their varied ends. One aspect of the term remained constant, however: the savage was always inferior to civilized men .... The constant of Indian inferiority implied the rejection of his hu­manity and determined the limits permitted for his participation in the mixing of cultures. The savage was prey, cattle, pet, or vermin-he was never citizen. Upholders of the myth denied that either savage tyranny or savage anarchy could rightfully be called government, and therefore there could be no justification for Indian resistance to European invasion. (59)


White Ignorance


When ThomasJefferson excoriates the "merciless Indian Savages" in the Declaration ofIndependence, then, neither he nor his readers will ex­perience any cognitive dissonance with the earlier claims about the equal­ity of all "men," since savages are not "men" in the full sense. Locked in a different temporality, incapable of self-regulation by morality and law, they are humanoid but not human. To speak of the "equality" of the sav­age would then be oxymoronic, since one's very location in these cate­gories is an indication of one's inequality. Even a cognizer with no antipathy or prejudice toward Native Americans will be cognitively dis­abled trying to establish truths about them insofar as such a category and its associated presuppositions will tend to force his conclusions in a cer­tain direction, will constrain what he can objectively see. One will experi­ence a strain, a cognitive tension between possible egalitarian findings and overarching category, insofar as "savage" already has embedded in it a narrative, a set of assumptions about innate inferiority, which will pre­clude certain possibilities. "Savages" tend to do certain things and to be unable to do others; these go with the conceptual territory. Thus the term itself encourages if not quite logically determines particular conclusions. Concepts orient us to the world, and it is a rare individual who can resist this inherited orientation. Once established in the social mind-set, its in­fluence is difficult to escape, since it is not a matter of seeing the phe­nomenon with the concept discretely attached but rather of seeing things through the concept itself. In the classic period of European expansion­ism, it then becomes possible to speak with no sense of absurdity of "empty" lands that are actually teeming with millions of people, of "dis­covering" countries whose inhabitants already exist, because the non­white Other is so located in the guiding conceptual array that different rules apply. Even seemingly straightforward empirical perception will be affected-the myth of a nation of hunters in contradiction to widespread Native American agriculture that saved the English colonists' lives, the myth of stateless savages in contradiction to forms of government from which the white Founders arguably learned, the myth of a pristine wilder­ness in contradiction to a humanized landscape transformed by thou­sands of years oflabor (Jennings 1976). In all of these cases, the concept is driving the perception, with whites aprioristically intent on denying what is before them. So if Kant famously said that perceptions without concepts are blind, then here it is the blindness of the concept itself that is blocking vision.

Originally, then, foundational concepts of racialized difference, and their ramifications in all sociopolitical spheres, preclude a veridical per­ception of nonwhites and serve as a categorical barrier against their eq­uitable moral treatment. The transition away from old-fashioned racism of this kind has not, however, put an end to white normativity but subtly



Charles W Mills

transformed its character. If previously whites were color demarcated as biologically and/or culturally unequal and superior, now through a strategic "color blindness" they are assimilated as putative equals to the status and situation of nonwhites on terms that negate the need for mea­sures to repair the inequities of the past. So white normativity manifests itself in a white refusal to recognize the long history of structural dis­crimination that has left whites with the differential resources they have today, and all of its consequent advantages in negotiating opportunity structures. If originally whiteness was race, then now it is racelessness, an equal status and a common history in which all have shared, with white privilege being conceptually erased. Woody Doane (2003) suggests that

"Color-blind" ideology plays an important role in the maintenance of white hegemony .... Because whites tend not to see themselves in racial terms and not to recognize the existence of the advantages that whites enjoy in American society, this promotes a worldview that emphasizes in­dividualistic explanations for social and economic achievemen t, as if the individualism of white privilege was a universal attribute. Whites also ex­hibit a general inability to perceive the persistence of discrimination and the effects of more subtle forms of institutional discrimination. In the context of color-blind racial ideology, whites are more likely to see the opportunity structure as open and institutions as impartial or objective in their functioning .... this combination supports an interpretative framework in which whites' explanations for inequality focus upon the cultural characteristics (e.g., motivation, values) of subordinate groups . . . . Politically, this blaming of subordinate groups for their lower eco­nomic position serves to neutralize demands for antidiscrimination ini­tiatives or for a redistribution of resources. (13-14, emphasis in original)

Indeed, the real racists are the blacks who continue to insist on the importance of race. In both cases white normativity underpins white priv­ilege, in the first case by justifying differential treatment by race and in the second case by justifying formally equal treatment by race that-in its denial of the cumulative effects of past differential treatment-is tanta­mount to continuing it.

What makes such denial possible, of course, is the management of memory. (Thus as earlier emphasized it is important to appreciate the in­terconnectedness of all of these components of knowing or non-knowing: this concept is viable in the white mind because of the denial of crucial facts.) Memory is not a subject one usually finds in epistemology texts, but for social epistemology it is obviously pivotal. French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992) was one of the pioneers of the concept ofa collective, social memory, which provided the framework for individual memories. But if we need to understand collective memory, we also need to under-


White Ignorance


stand collective amnesia. Indeed, they go together insofar as memory is necessarily selective-out of the infinite sequence of events, some trivial, some momentous, we extract what we see as the crucial ones and organize them into an overall narrative. Social memory is then inscribed in text­books, generated and regenerated in ceremonies and official holidays, concretized in statues, parks, and monuments. John Locke famously sug­gested memory as the crucial criterion for personal identity, and social memory plays a parallel role in social identity. Historian John Gillis (1994b, 3) argues that "the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa .... [But] memories and identities are not fixed things, but representations or constructions of reality .... '[M] emory work' is ... embedded in complex class, gender, and power relations that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end. If memory has its politics, so too does identity." As the individual re­presses unhappy or embarrassing memories that may also reveal a great deal about his identity, about who he is, so in all societies, especially those structured by domination, the socially recollecting "we" will be divided, and the selection will be guided by different identities, with one group suppressing precisely what another wishes to commemorate. Thus there will be both official and counter-memory, with conflicting judgments about what is important in the past and what is unimportant, what hap­pened and does matter, what happened and does not matter, and what did not happen at all. So applying this to race, there will obviously be an intimate relationship between white identity, white memory, and white amnesia, especially about nonwhite victims.

Hitler is supposed to have reassured his generals, apprehensive about the launching of World War II, by asking them: "Who now remembers the Armenians?" Because the Third Reich lost, the genocide of the Jews (though far less the Romani) is remembered. But who now remembers the Hereros, the Nama, the Beothuks, the Tasmanians, the Pequots? (For that matter, who does remember the Armenians, except the Armenians them­selves?) Who remembers the Congolese? In Adam Hochschild's (1998, ch. 19) chilling book on King Leopold II's regime of rubber and extermi­nation, which resulted in the deaths of 10 million people in the Belgian Congo, the final chapter is titled "The Great Forgetting." Through the sys­tematic destruction of state archives in Brussels-"the furnaces burned for eight days"-and the deliberate noncommemoration of the African vic­tims-"in none of the [Brussels Royal Museum of Central Africa's] twenty large exhibition galleries is there the slightest hint that millions of Con­golese met unnatural deaths"-a "deliberate forgetting" as an "active deed" was achieved (293-95), a purging of official memory so thorough and effi­cient that a Belgian ambassador to West Africa in the 1970s was astonished by the "slander" on his country in a Liberian newspaper's passing reference



Charles W Mills

to the genocide: "I learned that there had been this huge campaign, in the international press, from 1900 to 1910; millions of people had died, but we Belgians knew absolutely nothing about it" (297).1 Similarly, and closer to home, James Loewen's (1996) critical study of the silences and misrepre­sentations of standard American history textbooks points out that "The In­dian-white wars that dominated our history from 1622 to 1815 and were of considerable importance until 1890 have disappeared from our national memory," encouraging a "feel-good history for whites": "By down playing In­dian wars, textbooks help us forget that we wrested the continent from Na­tive Americans" (133). In the case of blacks, the "forgetting" takes the form of whitewashing the atrocities of slavery-the "magnolia myth" of paternal­istic white aristocrats and happy, singing darkies that dominated American textbooks as late as the 1950s-and minimizing the extent to which "the pe­culiar institution" was not a sectional problem but shaped the national economy, polity, and psychology (137-70). Du Bois refers to "the deliber­ately educated ignorance of white schools" (1995,459) and devotes the cli­mactic chapter of his massive Black Reconstruction in America (1998) to the documentation of the sanitization of the history of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction by white Southern historians.

Moreover, the misrepresentations of national textbooks have their counterpart in monuments and statuary: social memory made marble and concrete, national mnemonics of the landscape itself. In his study of Civil War monuments, Kirk Savage (1994, 130-31) argues that "Monuments served to anchor collective remembering," fostering "a shared and stan­dardized program of memory," so that "local memory earned credibility by its assimilation to a visible national memory." The postbellum decision to rehabilitate Robert E. Lee, commander in chief of the Confederate Army, thereby "eras[ing] his status as traitor," signified a national white reconcil­iation that required the repudiation of an alternative black memory:

The commemoration of Lee rested on a suppression of black memory, black truth .... [U.S. statesman Charles Francis] Adams could not jus­tifv a monument to Lee without denying the postwar reality of racial in­justice and its congruence with the Confederate cause. "Sectional reconciliation" of this kind was founded on the nonconciliation of African Americans, and on their exclusion from the legitimate arenas of cultural representation. Black Americans did not have their own monuments, despite the critical role they had played in swinging the balance of power-both moral and military-to the North .... The com­memoration of the Civil War in physical memorials is ultimately a story of systematic cultural repression .... Public monuments ... impose a permanent memory on the very landscape within which we order our lives. Inasmuch as the monuments make credible particular collectivi­ties, they must erase others. (134-35,143)


White Ignorance


At the level of symbolism and national self-representation, then, the denial of the extent of Native American and black victimization buttresses the airbrushed white narrative of discovery, settlement, and building of a shining city on the hill. But the editing of white memory has more con­crete and practical consequences also: as earlier emphasized it enables a self-representation in which differential white privilege, and the need to correct for it, does not exist. In other words, the mystification of the past underwrites a mystification of the present. The erasure of the history of Jim Crow makes it possible to represent the playing field as historically level, so that current black poverty just proves blacks' unwillingness to work. As individual memory is assisted through a larger social memory, so individual amnesia is then assisted by a larger collective amnesia. In his re­search on the continuing, indeed deepening, gap between white and black Americans, Thomas Shapiro (2004,75-76) remarks on how often white in­terviewees seemed to "forget" what they had just told him about the ex­tensive parental assistance they received, claiming instead that they had worked for it: "[X's] memory seems accurate as she catalogues all sorts of parental wealthfare with matching dollar figures .... However, as soon as the conversation turns to how she and her husband acquired assets like their home, cars, and savings account, her attitude changes dramatically .... The [Xs] describe themselves as self-made, conveniently forgetting that they inherited much of what they own." Thus the "taken­for-granted sense of [white] entitlement" erases the fact that "transformative assets," "inherited wealth lifting a family beyond their own achievements," have been crucial to their white success (76, 10, emphasis in original) and that blacks do not in general have such advantages because of the history of discrimination against them. Thomas McCarthy (2002, 2004) points out the importance of a politics of memory for closing the "peculiar gap be­tween academic historical scholarship and public historical consciousness that marks our own situation" (2002,641) and emphasizes that the even­tual achievement of racial justice can only be accomplished through a systematic national re-education on the historic extent of black racial sub­ordination in the United States and how it continues to shape our racial fates differentially today.

But forgetting, whether individual or social, will not even be neces­sary if there is nothing to remember in the first place. C. A. J. Coady's (1994) now classic book on testimony has made it irrefutably clear how dependent we are on others for so much of what we know, and is thus crucial to the elaboration of a social epistemology. Yet if one group, or a specific group, of potential witnesses is discredited in advance as being epistemically suspect, then testimony from the group will tend to be dis­missed or never solicited to begin with. Kant's (1960, 113, emphasis in original) infamous line about a "Negro carpenter's" views has often been



Charles W Mills

quoted, but never stales: "And it might be, that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid." Nonwhite inferiority necessarily has cognitive ramifications, un­dermining nonwhite claims to knowledge that are not backed up by Eu­ropean epistemic authority. In an 1840 letter, Daniel Butrick, a missionary to the Cherokees, gives a long list of the reasons "how whites try and fail to find out what Indians know because they refuse to recog­nize the humanity or intelligence of Native peoples," the result being "that such persons may spend all their days among the Indians and yet die as ignorant of their true character almost as if they had never been born" (Konkle 2004, 90, 92). During slavery, blacks were generally de­nied the right to testify against whites, because they were not seen as credible witnesses, so when the only (willing) witnesses to white crimes were black, these crimes would not be brought to light. At one point in German South-West Africa, white settlers demanded "that in court only the testimony of seven African witnesses could outweigh evidence pre­sented by a single white person" (Cocker 1998, 317). Similarly, slave nar­ratives often had to have white authenticators, for example, white abolitionists, with the racially based epistemic authority to write a preface or appear on stage with the author to confirm that what this worthy Negro said was indeed true.

Moreover, in many cases, even if witnesses would have been given some kind of grudging hearing, they were terrorized into silence by the fear of white retaliation. A black woman recalls the world of Jim Crow and the dangers of describing it for what it was: "My problems started when I began to comment on what I saw .... I insisted on being accurate. But the world I was born into didn't want that. Indeed, its very survival depended on not knowing, not seeing-and certainly, not saying any­thing at all about what it was really like" (cited in Litwack [1998, 34]). If black testimony could be aprioristically rejected because it was likely to be false, it could also be aprioristically rejected because it was likely to be true. Testimony about white atrocities-lynchings, police killings, race riots-would often have to be passed down through segregated informa­tional channels, black to black, too explosive to be allowed exposure to white cognition. The memory of the 1921 Tulsa race riot, the worst American race riot of the twentieth century, with a possible death toll of 300 people, was kept alive for decades in the black community long after whites had erased it from the official record. Ed Wheeler, a white re­searcher trying in 1970 to locate documentation on the riot, found that the official Tulsa records had mysteriously vanished, and he was only able, with great difficulty, to persuade black survivors to come forward


White Ignorance


with their photographs of the event: "The blacks allowed Wheeler to take the pictures only if he promised not to reveal their names, and they all spoke only on the condition of anonymity. Though fifty years had passed, they still feared retribution if they spoke out" (Hirsch 2002, 201).

Even when such fears are not a factor, and blacks do feel free to speak, the epistemic presumption against their credibility remains in a way that it does not for white witnesses. Black countertestimony against white mythology has always existed but would originally have been hand­icapped by the lack of material and cultural capital investment available for its production-oral testimony from illiterate slaves, ephemeral pam­phlets with small print runs, and self-published works such as those by au­todidact J. A. Rogers (1985), laboriously documen ting the achievements of men and women of color to contest the white lie of black inferiority. But even when propagated in more respectable venues-for example, the Negro scholarly journals founded in the early twentieth century­they were epistemically ghettoized by the Jim Crow intellectual practices of the white academy. As Stephen Steinberg (1995) points out, the United States and its white social sciences have "played ostrich" on the is­sues of race and racial division (ix), so that-in Du Bois's famous image of blacks in a cave trying desperately to communicate to white passersby, before gradually realizing that they are silenced behind the updated ver­sion of the veil, "some thick sheet of invisible but horribly tangible plate glass"-"[black critics] of whatever political stripe ... were simply met with a deaf ear." The testimony of Negro scholars saying the wrong thing (almost an analytic statement!) would not be registered. "[T]he margin­alization of black voices in academia was facilitated by an 'invisible but horribly tangible' color line that relegated all but a few black scholars to teach in black colleges far removed from the academic mainstream" (51). Consider, for example, an anthropology founded on the "obvious" truth of racial hierarchy. Or a sociology failing to confront the central so­cial fact of structural white domination. Or a history sanitizing the record of aboriginal conquest and black exploitation. Or a political science rep­resenting racism as an anomaly to a basically inclusive and egalitarian polity. Or, finally-in our own discipline-a political philosophy thriving for thirty years and supposedly dedicated to the elucidation of justice that makes next to no mention of the centrality of racial injustice to the "basic structure" of the United States and assumes instead that it will be more theoretically appropriate to start from the "ideal theory" assump­tion that society is the product of a mutually agreed upon, nonexploita­tive enterprise to divide benefits and burdens in an equitable way-and that this is somehow going to illuminate the distinctive moral problems of a society based on exploitative white settlement. In whatever discipline



Charles W Mills

that is affected by race, the "testimony" of the black perspective and its distinctive conceptual and theoretical insights will tend to be whited out. Whites will cite other whites in a closed circuit of epistemic authority that reproduces white delusions.

Finally, the dynamic role of white group interests needs to be recog­nized and acknowledged as a central causal factor in generating and sus­taining white ignorance. Cognitive psychologists standardly distinguish between "cold" and "hot" mechanisms of cognitive distortion, those at­tributable to intrinsic processing difficulties and those involving motiva­tional factors, and in analytic philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology there is a large and well-established body of work on self­deception and motivated irrationality, though located within an individ­ualistic framework (McLaughlin and Rorty 1988; Mele 2001). So claim­ing a link between interest and cognition is not at all unheard of in this field. But because of its framing individualism, and of course the aprior­istic exclusion in any case of the realities of white group domination, the generalization to racial interests has not been carried out.

What needs to be done, I suggest, is to extrapolate some of this lit­erature to a social context-one informed by the realities of race. Be­cause of its marginalization of social oppression, the existing social epistemology literature tends to ignore or downplay such factors. In contrast, in the left tradition this was precisely the classic thesis: (class) domination and exploitation were the foundation of the social order, and as such they produced not merely material differentials of wealth in the economic sphere but deleterious cognitive consequences in the ideational sphere. Marxism's particular analysis of exploitation, resting as it does on the labor theory of value, has proven to be fatally vulnera­ble. But obviously this does not negate the value of the concept itself, suitably refurbished.f nor undercut the prima facie plausibility of the claim that if exploitative socioeconomic relations are indeed founda­tional to the social order, then this is likely to have a fundamental shap­ing effect on social ideation. In other words, one can detach from a class framework a Marxist "materialist" claim about the interaction between exploitation, group interest, and social cognition and apply it with far more plausibility within a race framework. I have argued elsewhere that racial exploitation (as determined by conventional liberal standards) has usually been quite clear and unequivocal (think of Native American ex­propriation, African slavery, Jim Crow), requiring-unlike exploitation in the technical Marxist sense-no elaborate theoretical apparatus to discern, and that it can easily be shown to have been central to u.S. his­tory (Mills 2004). So vested white group interest in the racial status quo-the "wages of whiteness" in David Roediger's (1999) adaptation of


White Ignorance


Du Bois's famous phrase from Black Reconstruction (1998)-needs to be recognized as a major factor in encouraging white cognitive distortions of various kinds.

Nor is such "motivated irrationality" confined to the period of overt racism and de jure segregation. Recent attitudinal research by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders on public policy matters linked to race reveals "a deep and perhaps widening racial divide [that] makes the discovery of commonality and agreement between the races a dim prospect," and central to the shaping of white opinion, it turns out, is their perception of their group interests: "the threats blacks appear to pose to whites' col­lective well-being, not their personal welfare" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 33, 85). Race is the primary social division in the United States, these two political scientists conclude, and whites generally see black interests as opposed to their own. Inevitably, then, this will affect white social cogni­tion-the concepts favored (e.g., today's "color blindness"), the refusal to perceive systemic discrimination, the convenient amnesia about the past and its legacy in the present, and the hostility to black testimony on continuing white privilege and the need to eliminate it to achieve racial justice. As emphasized at the start, then, these analytically distinguishable cognitive components are in reality all interlocked with and reciprocally determining one another, jointly contributing to the blindness of the white eye.

In his wonderfully titled States of Denial, Stanley Cohen (2001) argues that "[w]hole societies may slip into collective modes of denial":

Besides collective denials of the past (such as brutalities against indige­nous peoples), people may be encouraged to act as if they don't know about the present. Whole societies are based on forms of cruelty, dis­crimination, repression or exclusion which are "known" about but

           never openly acknowledged ............. Indeed, distortions and self-delusions

           are most often synchronized ............. Whole societies have mentioned and

unmentionable rules about what should not be openly talked about. You are subject to a rule about obeying these rules, but bound also by a meta-rule which dictates that you deny your knowledge of the original rule. (10-11,45)

White ignorance has been able to flourish all of these years because a white epistemology of ignorance has safeguarded it against the dangers of an illuminating blackness or redness, protecting those who for "racial" reasons have needed not to know. Only by starting to break these rules and meta-rules can we begin the long process that will lead to the eventual overcoming of this white darkness and the achievement of an enlighten­ment that is genuinely multiracial.



Charles W Mills


1. However, Hochschild's book initiated a debate in Belgium that has now led to a Royal Museum of Central Africa show on the issue: "Memory of Congo:

The Colonial Era." Belgian historians dispute his figures and reject the charge of genocide. See the New York Times, February 9,2005, B3.

2. See Ruth]. Sample (2003) for a recent Kantian updating of the concept and an argument for bringing it back to the center of our concerns.


Alcoff, Linda Martin. 1996. Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Baldwin, James. 1993 [1961J. Nobody Knows My Name: More Notes of a Native Son.

New York: Vintage International.

Campbell, Richmond, and Bruce Hunter, eds. 2000. Moral Epistemology Natural­ized. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (supp.) 26. Calgary, AB: University of Cal­gary Press.

Coady, C. A.]. 1994 [1992J. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cocker, Mark. 1998. Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conflict with Tribal Peo­ples. London: Jonathan Cape.

Cohen, Stanley. 2001. States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering.

Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Curtis, James E., and John W. Petras, eds. 1970. The Sociology of Knowledge:

A Reader. New York: Praeger.

Doane, Ashley W., and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, eds. 2003. White Out: The Continu­ing Significance of Racism. New York: Routledge.

Doane, Woody. 2003. "Rethinking Whiteness Studies." In Doane and Bonilla­Silva (2003),3-18.

Du Bois, W. E. B. 1989 [1903J. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Penguin Books. ---. 1995 [1920J. "The Souls of White Folk." In WE. B. Du Bois: A Reader, ed.

David Levering Lewis, 453-65. New York: Henry Holt.

---. 1998 [1935J. Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880. New York: The Free Press.

Ellison, Ralph. 1995 [1952J. Invisible Man. New York: Vintage Books. Fredrickson, George M. 2002. Racism: A Short History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fuller, Steve. 2002. Social Epistemology. 2nd ed. Orig. ed. 1988. Bloomington: Uni­versity of Indiana Press.

Gibson, Donald B. 1989. "Introduction." In Du Bois (1989), vii-xxxv.

Gillis, John R., ed. 1994a. Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Prince­ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

---. 1994b. "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship." In Gillis (1994a),3-24.

Goldman, Alvin 1. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. New York: Oxford University Press.


White Ignorance


Gordon, Lewis R. 1995. Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:

Humanities Press.

Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory. Edited and translated by Lewis A.

Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harding, Sandra, ed. 2004. The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies. New York: Routledge.

Hirsch, James S. 2002. Riot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and Its Legacy.

New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Hochschild, Adam. 1998. King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. 1993a. Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History. Edited by Edmund Burke III. New York: Cambridge Uni­versity Press.

---. 1993b. "The Interrelations of Societies in History." In Hodgson (1993a), 3-28.

Jacobson, Matthew Frye. 1998. Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jennings, Francis. 1976 [1975J. The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. New York: W.W. Norton.

Kant, Immanuel. 1960. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.

Translated by John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kitcher, Philip. 1994. "Contrasting Conceptions of Social Epistemology."

In Schmitt (1994), 111-34.

Konkle, Maureen. 2004. Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Kornblith, Hilary. 1994a. "A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology."

In Schmitt (1994),93-110.

---, ed. 1994b. Naturalizing Epistemology. 2nd ed. Orig. ed. 1985. Cambridge:

MIT Press.

Litwack, Leon F. 1998. Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Loewen, James W. 1996 [1995J. Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong. New York: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster.

McCarthy, Thomas. 2002. "Vergangenheitsbewaltigungin the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery, Part I." Political Theory 30: 623-48.

---.2004. "Coming to Terms with Our Past: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, Part II." Political Theory 32: 750-72.

McLaughlin, Brian P., and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, eds. 1988. Perspectives on Self Deception. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Mele, Alfred R. 2001. Self Deception Unmasked. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Melville, Herman. 1986. "Benito Cereno." In Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Stories, 159-258. New York: Viking Penguin.

---. 2000. Moby Dick, or, The Whale. New York: Modern Library.



Charles W Mills

Mills, Charles W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ---. 1998 [1988J. "Alternative Epistemologies." In Epistemology: The Big Ques­tions, ed. Linda Martin Alcoff, 392-410. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

---. 2004. "Racial Exploitation and the Wages of Whiteness." In What White Looks Like: African American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question, ed. George Yancy, 25-54. New York: Routledge.

Quine, W. V. O. 1969a. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

---. 1969b. "Epistemology Naturalized." In Quine (1969a), 69-90.

Roediger, David R., ed. 1998. Black on White: Black Writers on What It Means To Be White. New York: Schocken Books.

---. 1999. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class. Rev. ed. Orig. ed. 1991. New York: Verso.

Rogers,]. A. 1985 [1952J. 100 Amazing Facts about the Negro with Complete Proof A Short Cut to the World History of the Negro. St. Petersburg, FL: Helga M. Rogers.

Sample, Ruth]. 2003. Exploitation: What It Is and Why It's Wrong. Lanham, MD:

Rowman & Littlefield.

Savage, Kirk. 1994. "The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipation and the Civil War Monument." In Gillis (1994a), 127-49.

Schmitt, Frederick F., ed. 1994. Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Shapiro, Thomas M. 2004. The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Rogers M. 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US. History.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Steinberg, Stephen. 1995. Turning Back: The Retreat from RacialJustice in American Thought and Policy. Boston: Beacon Press.

Sundquist, Eric]. 1993. To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Litera­ture. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.



Charles Mills: White Ignorance

"I sketch out in this chapter some of the features and the dynamic of what I see as a particularly pervasive - though hardly theorized - form of ignorance, what could be called white ignorance, linked to white supremacy." (p. 15)


"The phrase "white ignorance" implies the possibility of a contrasting "knowledge," a contrast that would be lost if all claims to truth were equally spurious, or just a matter of competing discourses

( ... ) mapping an epistemology of ignorance is for me a preliminary to reformulating an epistemology that will give us genuine knowledge." (p. 15)

Charles Mills 1951-Present



White Ignorance: Definition


White Ignorance = group-based cognitive handicap (p. 15) "that is not contingent, but in which race - white racism and/ or white racial domination and their ramifications - plays a crucial causal role." (p. 20)

"So white ignorance is best thought of as a cognitive tendency - an inclination, a doxastic disposition - which is not insuperable. If there is a sociology of knowledge, then there should also be a sociology of ignorance." (p. 23).

White ignorance is a tendency of cognizers where privilege "tend(s) to produce self-deception, bad faith, evasion, and misrepresentation." (p. 1 7)



Clarifying White Ignorance

White ignorance is a historical phenomenon (whiteness is a product of the modern period) (p. 20).


2.            Race plays a "determining role" in white ignorance (other types of ignorance may be present in white people, but they do not count as white ignorance if the ignorance is not caused by their being white) (pp. 20-21).

3.           In some cases, it is hard to make the determination that something is properly

classified as white ignorance (use of counterfactuals) (p. 21).

4.           White ignorance need not always be based on bad faith (p. 21).

5.           White Ignorance is not confined to white people (p. 22).


4.           White racial ignorance can produce a doxastic environment where black racial ignorance flourish (p. 22).


4.           White ignorance includes moral ignorance (= incorrect judgments about the rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves) (p. 22).


4.            White ignorance is not the only kind of privileged, group-based ignorance (p. 22). Male ignorance is another example.


4.           White ignorance is not uniform across the white population (people have other identities besides racial ones. Such identities may allow them to overcome racially-based ignorance) (pp. 22-23).


4.           The point of understanding white ignorance is that we want to avoid the cognitive processes that typically give rise to false beliefs. We want to "understand how certain social structures tend to promote these crucially flawed processes, how to personally extricate oneself from them." (p. 23).



Examples of White Ignorance



"the concept is driving the perception, with whites aprioristically intent on denying what is before them." (p. 27)


For example, the concept "savage" makes it so that whites do not see who they describe as "savage" as a human (p. 27).

Another example (?) not cited by Mills: Effects of belief on perceptual categorization (Payne 200 I).

Participants primed with the face of a black man are more likely to take a hand tool (e.g. pliers) to be a gun, compared to participants who are primed with the face of a white man.



Examples of White Ignorance


"Whiteness" = full humanity (white normativity) "Savage" = not fully human

"In the classic period of European expansionism) it then becomes possible to speak with no sense of absurdity of "empty" lands that are actually teeming with millions of people, of "discovering" countries whose inhabitants already exist, because the non-white Other is so located in the guiding conceptual array that different rules apply." (p. 27)



Deliberate forgetting (Armenians and Congolese genocides. The politics of colorblindess is also an act of deliberate forgetting according to Mills) (pp. 28-29).

Downplaying some historical events (the Indian wars or whitewashing the atrocities of slavery) and elevating others (monuments of confederate leaders) (p. 30).



Examples of White Ignorance


Testimonial injustice

"Yet if one group, or a specific group, of potential witnesses is discredited in advance as being epistemically suspect, then testimony from the group will tend to be dismissed or never solicited to being with." (p. 31)

Black testimony is aprioristically rejected (p. 32).

Motivated (group) irrationality

Emotion-biased decision or cognitive evaluation (p. 34).

"As emphasized at the start, then, these analytically distinguishable cognitive components are in reality all interlocked with and reciprocally determining one another, jointly contributing to the blindness of the white eye." (p. 35)

Similar to the last exam.

 it asks you to summarize and reflect critically on at least 10 relevant, authoritative sources about your social problem(s) and approaches. Ideally, you will find this assignment to be quite valuable because it will help you contribute to your group’s Issue Guide. Once you write your literature review, you will also have completed the formatting of entries for your required Works Cited page. 

I have already selected the ten sources, all that needs to be completed is the annotation part. There is an example of how it should be formatted and what should be said towards the bottom of the document. 

This assignment is similar to an annotated bibliography

Primary Task Response: Within the Discussion Board area, write 300–500 words that respond to the following questions with your thoughts, ideas, and comments. This will be the foundation for future discussions by your classmates. Be substantive and clear, and use examples to reinforce your ideas.

Drama (Playwriting)

When an author writes a dramatic piece, he or she does so with the expectation that it will result in a performance. Complete the following for this assignment:

Access The Stronger, a one-act play by August Strindberg, through this Web site. You can read the play, or you can listen to it on this Web siteNote: The audio version is number 9 in the list at the top.

Part 1

  • In 1 paragraph, discuss the following:
  • Identify the two characters in this play, and give a brief description of each. 
  • Identify the protagonist. Support your answer. 
  • Identify the antagonist(s). Support your answer. 
  • Identify the setting. Explain why this is important to the overall theme of the play.

Part 2

In 1–2 paragraphs, discuss the following:

  • How are the theme/characters in this play familiar to a reader today? Explain using details from the play. 
  • How are the theme/characters in this play unfamiliar to a reader today? Explain using details from the play. 
  • What do you think the playwright’s intention was in creating this play? Explain using details from the play. 
  • What can you take away from this play as a reader, and how can it be applied to your own life? 

Responses to Other Students: Respond to at least 2 of your fellow classmates with at least a 100-word reply about their Primary Task Response. To help you with your discussion, please consider the following questions:

  • How do you think readers today would enjoy this play? What parts would they have trouble understanding? 
  • How did your analysis of the meaning of the play compare with those of your classmates? Why do you think different readers might understand the play differently?  
  • How do you think seeing this play staged is different from reading the play? Are there elements of seeing the play staged that might help an audience understand it better? If so, what are they and how do they work? 
  • What questions do you have about how your classmates have understood and analyzed this play and its meaning for their own lives? 

The following grading criteria will be used to assess your Unit 5 Discussion Board.

Review your submission so you are sure you have included the following:

Drama (Playwriting)

Write: Your initial post should be at least 200 words in length. The minimum word count does not include references. Choose two of those critical approaches and address the points below.

  • Describe each critical approach in detail.
  • Compare and/or contrast the two critical approaches. How are they different and similar?
  • Determine which critical approach you find most useful for examining the conflicts and meaning in literature.
  • Explain why you chose this particular approach as the most useful. Why does it appeal to you?
Your initial post should be at least 200 words in length

 In your paper, address the following: Evaluate how a research study advances the scientific knowledge base of an identified field of study. Evaluate how a specific research study contributes to research theory and the field of study. Evaluate how the scientific methods of inquiry are applied to a specific research study. Evaluate the validity and reliability of a selected research study. Assess strategies for addressing ethical concerns in the design of a research study. Apply the terminology of research. Demonstrate both the depth and the breadth of your understanding of scientific research and scientific merit by including relevant examples and supporting evidence. Requirements The paper should be 10 to 12 pages long, not counting references, block quotes, or title page. Neither an abstract nor table of content is required, and would not count in the paper length. Minimum of seven scholarly resources. It is expected that one of these resources will be the study you selected for the Unit 2 assignment, and another will be the required textbook for the course, by Leedy and Ormrod. Use APA style and formatting, including correct in-text citations, proper punctuation, double-spacing throughout, proper headings and subheadings, no skipped lines before headings and subheadings, proper paragraph and block indentation, no bolding, and no bullets.

specific research study contributes to research theory

You are to write a five paragraph literary essay based on one of the 4 prompts and what you have read and learned in this module. These are your options:

1.How do the events of "The White Umbrella" teach the narrator a lesson about shame and acceptance?

2.What role does creativity play in "The Bat-Poet"?

3.How does the character of Squeaky change over the course of "Raymond's Run"?

4.Discuss the influences of older family members on the protagonists and speakers in the stories and poems of this unit.



Literary Essay

You are to write a five paragraph literary essay based on one of the 4 prompts and what you have read and learned in this module. These are your options:

1.    How do the events of "The White Umbrella" teach the narrator a lesson about shame and acceptance?

2.     What role does creativity play in "The Bat-Poet"?

3.    How does the character of Squeaky change over the course of "Raymond's Run"?

4.    Discuss the influences of older family members on the protagonists and speakers in the stories and poems of this unit.


You are to write a five paragraph literary essay based on what you have read and learned in this module. Your final submission should meet the following requirements.

·         Submit completed pre-writing and outline documents.

·         Write an essay that contains an introduction with hook and thesis statement, supporting paragraphs with evidence and at least one quotation, and a conclusion that restates the thesis and reviews main points.

·         Use transitions appropriate to the pattern of organization.

·         Use vocabulary to create tone and voice.

·         Cite primary source (quotation).

·         Submit completed revision checklist.

·         Vary sentence structure.

·         Create sentences with parallel structures.

·         Use technology in the writing process.

You are to write a five paragraph literary essay

800 word minimum

We’ve discussed Link’s strong grasp of magical realism and her expert use of it to seduce the reader into entering a world of hyper realism that in turn, makes magic more believable.

Discuss how Link does this by focusing on details from the title story of the collection. Point to at least three examples of something fantastic/surreal/magical happening and two examples of intensely realistic details. Whenever possible, explain how these two aspects work in unison, as mentioned above.

Then, explain how this relates to writing fiction in the general sense of a reader-writer relationship. We discussed the importance of “suspending disbelief” in order to prevent skepticism from ruining the experience of reading magical realism, but what other kind of emotional investment does Link expect from the reader? What kind of respect does she have for the reader? Give evidence from your reading to explain your rationale.

Don’t forget an intro and a conclusion to frame your thinking in this short essay!

Magic for Beginners: Stories by Kelly Link


Wald, Gayle. "Just a girl? Rock music, feminism, and the cultural construction of female youth." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 23.3 (1998): 585-610.

Weidhase, Nathalie. "‘Beyoncé feminism’ and the contestation of the black feminist body." Celebrity Studies 6.1 (2015): 128-131.

Durham, Aisha, Brittney C. Cooper, and Susana M. Morris. "The stage hip-hop feminism built: A new directions essay." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 38.3 (2013): 721-737.

Watch the video then write one page according the instructions: 

Harris-Perry, Melissa. “Beyonce drops her ‘feminist manifesto.’” Noninfinitum. MSNBC. YouTube. Dec 14, 2013. 


Students will submit a series of reflections on the course material for grading.  These reflections may take any form, but must include: 1) reference to the course material or one theoretical concept for the week and 2) relation to one’s personal life and/or a   popular culture example.  Reflections may take the form of: a written   paper, a video or vlog post, a song, podcast, zine, or any other form  of  creative work.  In the case of visual artistic submissions, a short   paragraph may accompany the work to demonstrate the connections to the   course material and personal life and/or popular culture.

Students  may submit up to 7 reflection journal  entries for grading.  Reflection  journals will be assessed using the  ICE rubric attached.  The top 5  grades will be used in calculating the  students grade for the 25% of the  reflection journals’  component.  Students may collaborate with up to  four people in up to 2  reflection journal entries.  Students who choose  to collaborate on reflection journal entries will receive the exact same  grade as their collaborators. 

Reflection  journal entries should be no more than 3 pages  in length if they are  written, or 5 minutes in length if they are  produced in another form, if  you have questions about length with  respect to another art form,  please contact the instructor.  Reflection  journal entries should be  handed in prior to the start of the  class.  Electronic submissions  through blackboard are preferred,  however, if the reflection is a  physical form, it should be handed in  right at the beginning of the  class.  Each reflection journal entry  should use the theory and concepts  for the class that is about to  commence.

Open the file ( In the bottom) and write 3 pages according to the instructions.

Wald, Gayle. "Just a girl? Rock music, feminism,
  • Read: Paul Pardi, “What is Truth?” and Thomas Sheehan, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”
  • In MLA style in  Word or Google document, summarize the key points made by the author.

Here is a link to the article.

Truth, like knowledge, is surprisingly difficult to define. We seem to rely on it almost every moment of every day and it's very "close" to us. Yet it's difficult to define because as soon as you think you have it pinned down, some case or counterexample immediately shows deficiencies. Ironically, every definition of truth that philosophers have developed falls prey to the question, "Is it true?"

Simply, we can define truth as: a statement about the way the world actually is. We'll look at various theories below that philosophers have considered but that's an adequate rough-and-ready definition to get us started. Coming up with a definition of truth falls under the discipline of epistemology or the study of knowledge though some philosophers categorize it as a study in metaphysics--the study of what is real.

In this essay, we'll look at some reasons why defining truth can be challenging. Truth seems like something we naturally comprehend and while intuition can help us a great deal in understanding what it is, surface definitions present us with unique problems and I’ll illustrate why. I'll then lay out some terms and concepts that will help us get a better handle on understanding what truth is. Next, we'll look at three main views of truth. The coherence theory describes truth in terms of interconnected belief. A belief is true if it is consistent with other beliefs we have. The correspondence theory describes truth in terms of a relation concepts or propositions have to the actual world. Finally postmodernism lays out a view of truth in terms of individual perspectives and community agreement. While this essay does not focus on practical issues like why a view of truth is important, I'll say a few words about that idea at the end and provide more resources for further reading.

Elusive Truth

I stated above that defining truth can be challenging. Let’s briefly look at why this is so by way of a seemingly simple example. Suppose you examine an apple and determine that it’s red, sweet, smooth and crunchy. You might claim this is what the apple is. Put another way, you've made truth claims about the apple and seemingly made statements about real properties of the apple. But immediate problems arise. Let's suppose your friend is color blind (this is unknown to you or her) and when she looks at the apple, she says that the apple is a dull greenish color. She also makes a truth claim about the color of the apple but it's different than your truth claim. What color is the apple?

Well, you might respond, that's an easy problem to solve. It's actually red because we've stipulated that your friend has an anomaly in her truth-gathering equipment (vision) and even though we may not know she has it, the fact that she does means her view of reality is incorrect. But now let’s suppose everyone is color blind and we all see "red" apples as green? We can make this objection even stronger by asking how we know that we all aren't in fact color blind in a way we don't understand and apples really aren't red after all. No one has access to the “real” color of the apple. Again, the response might be that that this is a knowledge problem, not a truth problem. The apple really is red but we all believe it’s green. But notice that the truth of the apple’s color has little role to play in what we believe. No one knows what the truth is and so it plays no role in our epistemology.

The challenge is that our view of truth is very closely tied to our perspective on what is true. This means that in the end, we may be able to come up with a reasonable definition of truth, but if we decide that no one can get to what is true (that is, know truth), what good is the definition? Even more problematic is that our perspective will even influence our ability to come up with a definition! These are no small concerns and we'll explore some responses below.

Some Preliminaries

Before we get to definitions of truth, we need to define some terms used in those definitions which will make things a little easier to digest. Epistemologists (people who study truth, belief and knowledge) use the following concepts as the framework for their study of truth.

Propositions. A common technical definition of a proposition (credited to Peter van Inwagen) is "a non-linguistic bearer of truth value." A proposition is a representation of the world or a way the world could possibly be and propositions are either true or false. Propositions are different than sentences. Sentences are symbolic, linguistic representations of propositions. Okay, that's all very technical. What does it mean?

Let's take the sentence, "The moon has craters." This is an English sentence that supposedly states some fact about the world or reality (and specifically about the moon). Because it’s in English, we say it's "linguistic" or language-based. If we're going to get philosophical about it, we could describe its properties as having four words and 17 letters, it's in the English language written in 11 point font and it's black. I could write the same sentence like this:

The moon has craters.

This sentence has different properties from the first one above. This one still has the same number of words and letters and it's in English. But it is in 18 point font and is written in blue. Now let's take this sentence, "La luna tiene cráteres." This sentence has four words but 19 letters. It's written in 11 point font and is black but it's Spanish. What do all three sentences have in common? Well, they all express the same idea or meaning and we could say the same "truth." We could express the same idea in Swahili, semaphore, Morse code, or any other symbolic system that conveys meaning.

Notice that the symbols themselves are neither true nor false. The meaning the sentences represent is either true or false. Sentences are symbolic representations of something else—propositions. The common property true of all sentences that express the same truth is what philosophers call the propositional content of the sentences or "the proposition." Now we can better understand the idea behind "non-linguistic bearer of truth value." Propositions are non-linguistic because they aren't written or spoken in a language. They bear truth because they are the things that are true or false. This is what allows them to be expressed or "exemplified" in a variety of different symbolic systems like language-based sentences. When it comes to understanding truth, many philosophers believe propositions are at the center.

Belief. Beliefs are things (at least) people have. They don't exist outside the mind. Some philosophers say beliefs are "dispositional." That is, they incline a person to behave in a way as if the thing they believe is true. So a belief, simply, is a proposition that a person accepts as representing the way the world actually is. Beliefs can be about false propositions and thus be "wrong" because the person accepts them as true. This is a critical distinction. While a proposition has to be true or false, beliefs can be about true or false propositions even though a person always accepts them as being true.

Some philosophers attempt to define truth "mind-independently." That means, they want to come up with a definition that doesn't depend on whether humans can actually believe or know what is true. Truth is viewed as independent of our minds and they seek a definition of it that captures this. Other philosophers have developed theories that keep people at the center. That is, truth and belief are considered together and are inseparable. I will try to make the relevance of the "epistemic" vs. "independent" views of truth relevant below.

Knowledge. Knowledge is belief in a true proposition that a person is justified in holding as true. The conditions under which a person is justified is complicated and there are many theories about when the conditions are met. Theories of knowledge attempt to describe when a person is in a "right" cognitive relationship with true propositions. I describe some theories of knowledge and some of the challenges in understanding when a person knows in an article for Philosophy News called "What is Knowledge?"

Common Definitions

The Coherence View of Truth

The main idea behind this view is that a belief is true if it "coheres" or is consistent with other things a person believes. For example, a fact a person believes, say "grass is green" is true if that belief is consistent with other things the person believes like the definition of green and whether grass exists and the like. It also depends on the interpretation of the main terms in those other beliefs. Suppose you’ve always lived in a region covered with snow and never saw grass or formed beliefs about this strange plant life. The claim "grass is green" would not cohere with other beliefs because you have no beliefs that include the concept "grass." The claim, "grass is green" would be nonsense because it contains a nonsensical term "grass." That is, you never formed a belief about grass so there’s nothing for this new belief to cohere with.

As you can see from the above description, coherence theories typically are described in terms of beliefs. This puts coherence theories in the "epistemic" view of truth camp noted above. This is because, coherence theorists claim, we can only ground a given belief on other things we believe. We cannot "stand outside" our own belief system to compare our beliefs with the actual world. If I believe Booth shot Lincoln, I can only determine if that belief is truth based on other things I believe like "Wikipedia provides accurate information" or "My professor knows history and communicates it well" or "Uncle John sure was a scoundrel".

These are other beliefs and serve as a basis for my original belief. Thus truth is essentially epistemic since any other model requires a type of access to the "real world" we simply can't have. As philosopher Donald Davidson describes the situation, "If coherence is a test of truth, there is a direct connection with epistemology, for we have reason to believe many of our beliefs cohere with many others, and in that case we have reason to believe many of our beliefs are true." (Davidson, 2000)

Figure: The Coherence Theory


The Correspondence Theory of Truth

Arguably the more widely-held view of truth (stemming from a broader rationalist tradition in philosophy), philosophers who argue for the correspondence theory hold that there is a world external to our beliefs that is somehow accessible to the human mind. More specifically, correspondence theorists hold that there are a set of "truth-bearing" representations (or propositions) about the world that align to or correspond with reality or states of affairs in the world. A state of affairs just is a particular way the world or reality is. When a proposition aligns to the world, the proposition is said to be true. Truth, on this view, is that correspondence relation.

Take this proposition: "The Seattle Seahawks won Super Bowl 48 in 2014." The proposition is true if in fact the Seahawks did win super Bowl 48 in 2014 (they did) and false if they didn't.

Notice that on this view, propositions about reality are different from beliefs we may have of reality. We believe propositions--I believe that the moon has craters. What follows the "that" is meant to signify the proposition that a person believes. So truth on this view is when the proposition matches reality.

Figure: The Correspondence Theory

The correspondence theory only lays out the condition for truth in terms of propositions and the way the world actually is. This definition does not involve beliefs that people have. Propositions are true or false regardless of whether anyone believes them. Just think of a proposition as a way the world possibly could be: "The Seahawks won Super Bowl 48" or "The Seahawks lost Super Bowl 48" -- both propositions possibly are true. True propositions are those that correspond to what actually happened.

You'll notice that this definition does not include a belief component. That is, unlike the coherence theory, the correspondence theory describes truth in terms that are independent of beliefs humans may have. This has the distinct advantage of separating truth from the messy business of belief and knowledge but may warrant complaints of being impractical.


Postmodern thought covers a wide theoretical area but informs modern epistemology particularly when it comes to truth. Postmodern theories of truth are difficult to articulate in strict terms because postmodern theorists tend to eschew hard and fast definitions. But we can provide some insight here. Put in simple terms, postmodernists describe truth not as a relationship outside of the human mind that we can align belief to but as a product of belief. We never access reality because we can never get outside our own beliefs to do so. Our beliefs function as filters that keep reality (if such a thing exists) beyond us. Since we can never access reality, it does no good to describe knowledge or truth in terms of reality because there's nothing we can actually say about it that's meaningful. Truth then is constructed by what we perceive and ultimately believe.

Immanuel Kant

I'm inclined to earmark the foundation of postmodern thought with the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically with his work The Critique of Pure Reason. In my view, Kant was at the gateway of postmodern thought. He wasn't a postmodernist himself but provided the framework for what later developed.  

Immanuel Kant

Kant makes a foundational distinction between the "objects" of subjective experience and the "objects" of "reality." He labels the former phenomena and that latter noumena. The noumena for Kant are things in themselves (ding an sich). These exist outside of and separate from the mind. This is what we might call "reality" or actual states of affairs similar to what we saw in the correspondence theory above. But for Kant, the noumena are entirely unknowable in and of themselves. However, the noumena give rise to the phenomena or are the occasion by which we come to know the phenomena.

The phenomena make up the world we know, the world "for us" (für uns). This is the world of rocks, trees, books, tables, and any other objects we access through the five senses. This is the world of our experience. This world, however, does not exist apart from our experience. It is essentially experiential. Kant expressed this idea as follows: the world as we know it is "phenomenally real but transcendentally ideal." That is objects that we believe exist in the world are a "real" part of our subjective experience but they do not exist apart from that subjective experience and don't transcend the ideas we have. The noumena are "transcendentally real" or they exist in and of themselves but are never experienced directly or even indirectly.

The noumena are given form and shape by what Kant described as categories of the mind and this 'ordering' gives rise to phenomenal objects. This is where it relates to truth: phenomenal objects are not analogues, copies, representations or any such thing of the noumena. The noumena gives rise to the phenomena but in no way resembles them. Scholars have spent countless hours trying to understand Kant on this point since it seems like the mind interacts with the noumena in some way. But Kant does seem to be clear that the mind never experiences the noumena directly and the phenomena in no way represents the noumena. kant's metaphysics - noumenal and phenomenal

We can now see the beginnings of postmodern thought. If we understand the noumena as “reality” and the phenomena as the world we experience, we can see that we never get past our experience to reality itself. It's not like a photograph which represents a person and by seeing the photograph we can have some understanding of what the "real person" actually looks like. Rather (to use an admittedly clumsy example) it's like being in love. We can readily have the experience and we know the brain is involved but we have no idea how it works. By experiencing the euphoria of being in love, we learn nothing about how the brain works.

On this view then, what is truth? Abstractly we might say truth is found in the noumena since that's reality. But postmodernists have taken Kant's idea further and argued that since we can't say anything about the noumena, why bother with it at all? Kant didn’t provided a good reason to believe the noumena exists but seems to have asserted its existence because, after all, something was needed to give rise to the phenomena. Postmodernists just get rid of this extra baggage and focus solely on what we experience.

Perspective and Truth

Further, everyone's experience of the world is a bit different--we all have different life experiences, background beliefs, personalities and dispositions, and even genetics that shape our view of the world. This makes it impossible, say the postmodernists to declare an "absolute truth" about much of anything since our view of the world is a product of our individual perspective. Some say that our worldview makes up a set of lenses or a veil through which we interpret everything and we can't remove those lenses. Interpretation and perspective are key ideas in postmodern thought and are contrasted with "simple seeing" or a purely objective view of reality--something postmodernists reject as impossible.

We only have interconnected beliefs and for each individual, that's what truth is. We can see some similarities here to the coherence theory of truth with its web of interconnected and mutually supported beliefs. But where the coherence theory holds that coherence among beliefs gives us reason to hold that what we believe corresponds to some external reality, postmodernists reject that. In postmodernism there is nothing for our beliefs to correspond to or if there is, our beliefs never get beyond the limits of our minds to enable us to make any claims about that reality.

Community Agreement

Postmodernism differs from radical subjectivism (truth is centered only in what an individual experiences) by allowing that there might be "community agreement" for some truth claims. The idea is that two or more people may be able to agree on a particular truth claim and form a shared agreement that a given proposition is true. To be clear, it's not true because they agree it maps or corresponds to reality. But since the group all agree that a given proposition or argument works in some practical way, or has explanatory power (seems to explain some particular thing), or has strong intuitive force for them, they can use this shared agreement to form a knowledge community.

When you think about it, this is how things tend to work. A scientist discovers something she takes to be true and writes a paper explaining why she thinks it's true. Other scientists read her paper, run their own experiments and either validate her claims or are unable to invalidate her claims. These scientists then declare the theory "valid" or "significant" or give it some other stamp of approval. In most cases, this does not mean the theory is immune from falsification or to being disproved--it's not absolute. It just means that the majority of the scientific community that have studied the theory agree that it’s true given what they currently understand. This shared agreement creates a communal "truth" for those scientists. This is what led Richard Rorty to state the oft-quoted phrase, "Truth is what my colleagues will let me get away with."

Practical Concerns

Philosophers are supposed to love wisdom and wisdom is more oriented towards the practical than the theoretical. This article has been largely about a theoretical view of truth so how do we apply it? Most people don't spend a whole lot of time thinking about what truth is but tend to get by in the world without that understanding. That's probably because the world seems to impose itself on us rather than being subject to some theory we might come up with about how it has to operate. We all need food, water and shelter, meaning, friendship, and some purpose that compels us to get out of bed in the morning. This is a kind of practical truth that is not subject to the fluidity of philosophical theory.

Even so, we all contend with truth claims on a daily basis. We have to make decisions about what matters. Maybe you're deeply concerned about politics and what politicians are claiming or what policy should be supported or overturned. Perhaps you care about which athlete should be traded or whether you should eat meat or support the goods produced by a large corporation. You may want to know if God exists and if so, which one. You probably care what your friends or loved ones are saying and whether you can count on them or invest in their relationship. In each of these cases, you will apply a theory of truth whether you realize it or not and so a little reflection on what you think about truth will be important.

Your view of truth will impact how you show up at work and impacts the decisions you make about how to raise your children or deal with a conflict. For example, suppose you're faced with a complex question at work about something you're responsible for. You need to decide whether to ship a product or do more testing. If you're a postmodernist, your worldview may cause you to be more tentative about the conclusions you're drawing about the product's readiness because you understand that your interpretation of the facts you have about the product may be clouded by your own background beliefs. Because of this, you may seek more input or seek more consensus before you move forward. You may find yourself silently scoffing at your boss who makes absolute decisions about the "right" way to move forward because you believe there is no "right" way to do much of anything. There's just each person's interpretation of what is right and whoever has the loudest voice or exerts the most force wins.

An engineer may disagree here. She may argue, as an example, that there is a "right" way to build an airplane and a lot of wrong ways and years of aviation history documents both. Here is an instance where the world imposes itself on us: airplanes built with wings and that follow specific rules of aerodynamics fly and machines that don't follow those "laws" don't. Further most of us would rather fly in airplanes built by engineers that have more of a correspondence view of truth. We want to believe that the engineers that built the plane we're in understand aerodynamics and built a plane that corresponds with the propositions that make up the laws of aerodynamics.

Your view of truth matters. You may be a correspondence theorist when it comes to airplanes but a postmodernist when it comes to ethics or politics. But why hold different views of truth for different aspects of your life? This is where a theory comes in. As you reflect on the problems posed by airplanes and ethics, the readiness of your product to be delivered to consumers and the readiness of your child to be loosed upon the world, about what makes you happy and about your responsibility to your fellow man, you will develop a theory of truth that will help you navigate these situations with more clarity and consistency.


Ackerman, D. F. (1976, December). Plantinga, Proper Names and Propositions. Philosophical Studies, 30, 409-412.

Barrett, W. (1962). Irrational Man. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

Brown, C. (1986). What Is a Belief State? Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10, 357-78.

Brown, C. (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 289-316.

Chisholm, R. (1957). Percieving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University.

Chisholm, R. M. (1989). Theory of Knowledge (3 ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Davidson, D. (2000). A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In S. Bernecker, & F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (pp. 413-428). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1998, August 13). Postmodernism and Truth. Retrieved December 26, 2014, from Tufts:

Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frankfurt, H. (2006). On Truth. New York: Knopf.

Gettier, E. (2000). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge. In S. Bernecker, & F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. Amazon Digital Services, Inc.

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59 (235), 320-344.

Williams, B. (2004). Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Read: Paul Pardi, “What is Truth?

Objective #1 Students will understand economic, political, and social legacies of imperialism and colonialism, with reference to linguistic or cultural diversity, for societies, groups, and individuals.  Many of the purveyors of Jazz are African American.  The curriculum utilizes significant periods in American history as it relates to the evolution of the African American experience.  The example of imperialism and colonialism is directly reflected by the evolution of Jazz as a musical experience.  The curriculum focuses on the social and cultural impact of Jazz as it relates to the African American experience and integration into a traditional Western tradition.


Objective #2 Students will be able to compare historical perspectives on the development of various cultures.  Jazz historically transcends the social norm and is characterized by a wide variety of societies, ethnicities, and economic backgrounds.  The experience is reflected in Jazz as a social, political, and cultural commentary as well as a musical art form.

Resource can be used:

Format: 3 pages (minimum), double spaced Font:  Times, 12-pt. 1inch margins.


Midterm Essay

Primary Task Response: Within the Discussion Board area, write 300–500 words that respond to the following questions with your thoughts, ideas, and comments. This will be the foundation for future discussions by your classmates. Be substantive and clear, and use examples to reinforce your ideas.

Relating to Readers

Writers of fiction attempt to connect with others through shared storytelling.

Part 1

Write 2–3 paragraphs that answer the following:

  • Define fiction in your own words.
  • Do you read any books in this genre? Why or why not?
  • Pick 1 subgenre of fiction, and describe it.

Part 2

Write 2–3 paragraphs to answer the following:

  • Why read fiction?
  • Is it entertaining? Why or why not?
  • Is it educational? Why or why not?
  • What do you learn about others through reading their work?
  • What is active reading? How does this help the reader determine the author’s message?

Responses to Other Students: Respond to at least 2 of your fellow classmates with at least a 100-word reply about their Primary Task Response regarding items you found to be compelling and enlightening. To help you with your discussion, please consider the following questions:

  • How did the definitions of fiction provided by your classmates compare with your own?
  • Are your reading habits similar or different from those of your classmates?
  • Do you use active reading when you read fiction in your everyday life? If not, how can active reading help to enrich your experience of fictional texts?
  • Do you have any questions about the details and explanations your classmates have posted?

For assistance with your assignment, please use your text, Web resources, and all course materials.

The following grading criteria will be used to assess your Unit 2 Discussion Board.

Review your submission so you are sure you have included the following:

Unit 2 Discussion Board Grading CriteriaMaximum PointsDefines fiction accurately


Discuss the role that fiction does or does not play in his/her life


Provides an adequate rationale for the value of fiction


Describes the value of active reading in understanding fiction


Responds in detail to work of at least 2 classmates



Within the Discussion Board area, write 300–500 words

Key Messages and Themes

In literary fiction, these elements are sometimes subtle; other times, they are very obvious.

In this assignment, you will explore The Canterville Ghost by Oscar Wilde (accessible through this Web site). Read Chapter 1 of the story. Then, use the provided template to create a PowerPoint presentation of 5–6 slides (include speaker notes) that addresses the following:

  • Who are the 6 characters present in this passage? What can you tell about them based on their names alone? Does the author reveal any other details about these characters?
  • Based on the details the author provides, what did you learn about the Canterville Chase? Does this sound like a place you have ever visited? Why or why not?
  • Notice the language. Do you think this story takes place in a modern time? Why or why not?
  • Who is telling the story? What is the point of view of the narrator?
  • Based on this passage, are you interested in reading more of this story? Why or why not?

Please submit your assignment.

The following grading criteria will be used to assess your Unit 2 Individual Project

Review your submission so you are sure you have included the following:

Unit 2 Individual Project Grading CriteriaMaximum PointsSubmits a PowerPoint presentation of 5-6 slides, includes title and reference slides


Identifies the six characters named in the passage


Provides an adequate overview of what the author reveals about each character


Discusses the relevant details of the setting


Analyzes the use of language to set tone/mood using specific examples


Writes in a clear and organized manner using proper, spelling, grammar, and punctuation




For assistance with your assignment, please use your text, Web resources, and all course materials.



Project Gutenberg. (n.d.). The Project Gutenberg ebook, the Canterville ghost, by Oscar Wilde, illustrated by Wallace Goldsmith. Retrieved from

In literary fiction, these elements are sometimes subtle;

The purpose of the Discussion Board is to allow students to learn through sharing ideas and experiences as they relate to course content and the DB question. Because it is not possible to engage in two–way dialogue after a conversation has ended, no posts to the DB will be accepted after the end of each unit.

Discuss the following:

  • What involvement does management need to have to achieve buy-in from internal and external stakeholders?
The purpose of the Discussion Board is to allow students to learn through sharing idea

Literary Analysis

Assignment & Purpose

Explore a literary text or texts (poems or short stories discussed in class) and analyze how the literary elements work to emphasize or contradict the meanings. You will not simply make an observation about how the author uses an element in the text or an observation about what the theme is, but tell why the element is interesting, revealing, significant, or strange. Remember analysis is not about “one right answer” but an exploration of multiple meanings and implications. 

"The Second Coming" (Links to an external site.)


· MLA format (heading, header, double spaced, works cited, etc.) 

· Times New Roman, 12-point font

· Academic writing style (Professional 3rd Person Voice)

· 1000 words minimum (excluding Works Cited)

· At least ONE outside, scholarly source

· Analytical and Argumentative Thesis Statement 

· Solid Analysis and use of Literary Criticism 

· Solid Organizational Scheme 

Course Student Learning Outcomes

· Identify the elements of a literary work.

· Develop a controlling idea/theme about the literary work.

· Organize information to support the controlling idea.

· Complete the writing of a literary analysis paper through drafting, revising, and editing using Standard American English and MLA format.

· Demonstrate critical thinking standards as they engage in analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of literary sources in order to explore patterns and contradictions among images and present the complexity of multiple interpretations and implications. 

· Write in a style that clearly communicates meaning, builds credibility, and offers fresh insights. 

Evaluation Criteria 

See Grading Rubric on class website 

The following categories determine the grade for each submitted paper: Meets Assignment, Introduction, Thesis, Focus on Thesis, Content, Analysis, Organization, Audience, Closing, Format, and Mechanics. Not all of these elements are weighted the same, but all are part of the final grade for your paper. The most important aspect of any paper in this class is critical thinking.

Due Date: Friday, March 1

Explore a literary text or texts


Who is the villain in this story? What qualities or characteristics make someone or something a villain? Explain in a five paragraph essay.


 The Scarlet Letter Chapters 19-24 


The Scarlet Letter has been placed in the genre of a love story or romance novel. Others have said it is a story of adventure and survival. In what genre do you think this story belongs? Explain in a five paragraph essay.

First The Scarlet Letter Chapters 7-12

As I promised, I have revised the requirements for the research paper. Rather than asking you to submit a 4000-word document, the assignment has been revised as follows:

You watched three films at the residency: War Games (1993), Deep Web (2015), and Hidden Figures (2016)

Please choose one of those films and write a summary of how that film can have an effect on popular understanding of CyberLaw.

As I promised, I have revised the requirements for the research paper.

"Shakespeare" Please respond to the following, using sources under the Explore heading as the basis of your response:

  • Discuss your reaction to the character of Hamlet in the two (2) soliloquies from the text. Consider the extent to which you sympathize with him and / or think he is self-absorbed. Explain the manner in which the literary form of soliloquy shapes your view of Hamlet. Identify one (1) or two (2) lines (except "To be, or not to be") that you find interesting or favor, and explain your choice. Pretend you are a modern leader or celebrity facing personal crisis, such as Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Mandela, Hillary Clinton, Bill Gates, Beyoncé, or some other; write a few lines of soliloquy, thinking aloud in front of the audience. (No need to sound Shakespearean).
  • Discussion posts should be at least 300 words.



  • Chapter 19 (pp. 650-656), selections 19.11a and 19.11b. Soliloquy defined on p. 653; review Week 10 Music Folder
Shakespeare" Please respond to the following,

For this assignment, you will write an annotated bibliography on three sources. For detailed information on how to create your Annotated Bibliography, please see this Sample Annotated BibliographyPreview the document.

In your Annotated Bibliography, you will

  • Copy and paste the writing prompt you chose to explore in Week One into a Word Document.
  • Restate the working thesis you created in Week One below your writing prompt.
  • In this same document, identify your primary source (your short story) and two secondary, academic sources.
  • Summarize each source and explain how the source supports your working thesis. These summaries should be 100 to 150 words for each entry.

For the Annotated Bibliography assignment, you will write annotations for three sources. One source should be a primary source. Next, you will choose two secondary sources that are additional to the text.

The two sources you locate must be academic sources and come from peer-reviewed journals or other scholarly publications. For information on finding sources within the Ashford Library, please view the ENG125 - Literature Research tutorial (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site..

The Annotated Bibliography includes a citation of the source in APA format. It also includes a brief summary of the source.

you will write an annotated bibliography on three sources

·         WEEK: Modern Lit and Society


·         1.Violence in Poetry GM225


The theme of violence in the poetry of Yeats and Owen were brought on by WWI. Yeats, from Ireland had the perspective of an Irishmen going through the Irish revolts and the Easter Uprising. His poem "Easter, 1916" was written about the Easter Uprising that happened because the British promised the Irish that they would let them rule over their country, Ireland in 1914. When WWI broke out, the English put that promise on the back burner, which enraged the Irish. Many that participated in the uprising, especially it's leaders were executed. Yeats, knowing many of them, was troubled by it. 

"We know their dream; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead;"

Lines 70-71, Yeats states that they had a dream, of the Irish becoming free, yet that dream is ultimately why they are now dead.

Owen was British and wrote much about WWI and the devastation it brought. His poems give a powerful image as to what the soldiers went through in the war. The opening line of "Anthem of Doomed Youth":

"What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?"

Gives a horrible image that the soldiers that were going off to war were like a herd of cattle heading to be slaughtered. In lines 21-24 of Dulce et Decorum Est, Owen gave another horrible image. 

"If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,–"

This gives a chilling description of what war is/was like for soldiers. Even the ones that survive had/have to deal with the memories of what they saw, which is what Owen described in this poem.

These poets could not escape the theme of violence in their lives and so it came through in their works.

·         2.Yeats & Owens VT225


               Yeats and Wilfred Owen were poets in the early 1900’s, who were very much influence by war. Owen’s writing shows a want to depict the actual experience of battle to people, but Yeats was a little condescending towards Owen’s want. Yeats felt that poetry should be used as an escape from such a bloody hell. He was also very involved with the politics of the time. Yeats used some of his poems to make political statements such as September 1913, in which he criticized and mocked the Irish Catholic middle-classes, calling them incapable of rising up and revolting, and Eater 1916, in which recants the ridicule from his previous poem.

Although Yeats speaks of things in a slightly violent way from poem to poem, Owen’s work his almost entirely dedicated to trying to depict his own experiences. When analyzing Wilfred Owen’s poems such as, Anthem for Doomed Youth or Strange Meeting, you will notice that his works are quite graphic in its depictions of the battlefields. This tendency to write about battle and war seems to come from influences of World War I. Strange Meeting,however violent it may seem, is a very interesting perspective on soldiers in battle.


·         3.Yeats and Owens BT225


The violence shown in Yeats’ poetry is mainly due to war, politics and sexuality. In “The Second Coming”, it appears that the mind of the poet is a bit gloomy. Such is due to the consequence of the civil war in Ireland, which occurred during the Easter Rebellion, along with other events. In another Yeats’ poem, ‘Easter 1916’, the speaker quarrels with himself and with history.


In Owen’s poetry, we are also shown violence. Owen’s poetry is filled with warfare themes, which is the major contribution of such violence in the poems. Specifically, “Strange Meeting” is congested with soldiers and the distress they continue to endure, even following death. The speaker may have escaped battle, but he has entered “hell”. In this poem “hell” is a location where the distresses of war are replayed over and over. Unfortunately, there is no escape from this violence.

·         4.Violence: Yeats & Owens DW224

Yeats and Owens poems dealt with the effects of war and tackled the issues in different methods. Their poems were a depiction of the spoils of war and its effect on society.   


Yeats enjoyed mysticism and the occult, which explains the violence described in his poetry.  He was an eccentric pessimist who always expected something bad to happen, as expressed in the poem, “The Second Coming”. His one abnormal issue is an attachment to war and violence of a system out of control.  As you read through the poem, you may notice that even in today’s world, humanity is losing touch with nature and has to deal with the consequences.  This sentiment is echoed in its apocalyptic theme of constant torment of violence.


On the other hand, Owen critiqued the soldiers experience with his poetry and mimicked the literary works of other authors of the early nineteenth century.  The sentimental writing style and attitudes toward the brutality of war depicts Owens views of a man sensitive to the burden of soldiery.  It is important to note that Owen’s poetry is recognized as being a direct reflection of the truth regarding military combat.  This type of demise clearly can be seen in the poem, “Anthem, For Doomed Youth”.


















·         5.Violence in Yeats and Owen CJ224

 “When I excluded Wilfred Owen, whom I consider unworthy of the poets' corner of a country newspaper, I did not know I was excluding a revered sandwich board man of the revolution…He is all blood, dirt and sucked sugar stick.” – Yeats


Though both Yeats and Owen wrote extensively of the personal and socioeconomic ills befallen to a group of people within a world war, they both attacked this issue in vastly different ways. Upon reading Yeats, one comes away with a feeling of trepidation on his part. Poems such as “No Second Troy” and “Easter, 1916” display feelings of doubt surrounding the use of violence to spread an idea. In “No Second Troy” he speaks of a woman that broke his heart that he has now forgiven, but is still critical of her revolutionary sentiments. In “Easter, 1916” Yeats describes the Easter uprising, reminiscing on the lives lost and ending the poem asking the question “was it worth it?”

Owen, on the other hand, was a little more headstrong and heavy-handed in his critique of violence (one that Yeats rejected and belittled). In his apocalyptic “The Second Coming,” he paints a picture of utter destruction and upheaval caused by the war. This destruction is universal, as he believes that the entire "centre cannot hold” (3). Owen also rejects wartime violence in his poem “Anthem for Doomed Youth” – he describes men dying “as cattle” (1), and goes into detail, painting a picture of the mortality and meaningless of a soldier’s life. For Owen, in wartime, a dying man’s goodbye is not prayers or bells, but a distraught wife back home drawing down the blinds.





Breathe. The methods section is the paint by number. If someone wanted to replicate your study, this is the how to guide to make that happen. How did you find your subjects or texts? How did you analyze… this is not your opinion, just what you are going to be doing. STEP TWO: Remember, up until now your paper should have introduced your topic and then built an argument as to what research surrounds your topic (literature review.) Your methods section is the way for your audience to understand your process. If they really wanted to replicate the study, this is the step-by-step way that it can be done. STEP THREE: A. Data… What we need here is the “what” of your project. What is the data? (What are you planning on analyzing? Interviews, newspaper content, movie segments… etc. B. Materials and information: Do you need a voice recorder? If so, how are you going to get it? If you are doing phone interviews, are you buying the phone recorder? a. Are there issues particular to any of your materials? If you are using a sound recorder, how do you ensure privacy? b. Are there limitations that will stem from using that particular material (audio versus video) C. Who provides this data or materials? a. Who/What is your population and how did you access them? b. Who/What are your participants, or what materials are you using – how did you make that decision? c. Sample size (right now you are guessing as you don’t really know your saturation point. If you don’t have a specific number simply make a statement such as, “I intend on using 10% of all examples… or I intend on collecting data for two months…” d. Do we need to know anything in particular about your sample? If not everyone, who? How did you choose? In what way did you choose your sample? (Convenience sample – those who offer to participate; Snowball sample – asking someone to identify someone else, who then identifies someone else; Partial sample – percent of total, random sample of total, particular partial example that meets a particular guideline. D. Questionnaire or measures are you using? a. If you are using something someone else designed (scales or survey questions) how do you know about reliability (how has it been tested/developed) Justify this measure over others – answer the why question (Why this one?) b. If YOU are creating the measure i. Why are you developing a new measure (the purpose that it serves – which could be as there is no current way to measure this item.) ii. How did you choose to develop the parts and pieces – did you take elements from other interviews or surveys and put them together? iii. What type of format will you use? Qual survey versus interview, document versus face-to-face. iv. How will you assess reliability? Reliability checking with another person – data checking… looking for consistency in triangulated methods. E. Methods or techniques used a. What are the variables (the items of study) b. How are you going to control for other outside variables?


STEP ONE: Breathe. The methods section is the paint by number. If someone wanted to replicate your study, this is the how to guide to make that happen. How did you find your subjects or texts? How did you analyze… this is not your opinion, just what you are going to be doing.

STEP TWO: Remember, up until now your paper should have introduced your topic and then built an argument as to what research surrounds your topic (literature review.) Your methods section is the way for your audience to understand your process. If they really wanted to replicate the study, this is the step-by-step way that it can be done.


A.      Data… What we need here is the “what” of your project. What is the data? (What are you planning on analyzing? Interviews, newspaper content, movie segments… etc.

B.      Materials and information: Do you need a voice recorder? If so, how are you going to get it? If you are doing phone interviews, are you buying the phone recorder?

a.       Are there issues particular to any of your materials? If you are using a sound recorder, how do you ensure privacy?

b.      Are there limitations that will stem from using that particular material (audio versus video)

C.      Who provides this data or materials?

a.       Who/What is your population and how did you access them?

b.      Who/What are your participants, or what materials are you using – how did you make that decision?

c.       Sample size (right now you are guessing as you don’t really know your saturation point.  If you don’t have a specific number simply make a statement such as, “I intend on using 10% of all examples… or I intend on collecting data for two months…”

d.      Do we need to know anything in particular about your sample? If not everyone, who? How did you choose? In what way did you choose your sample? (Convenience sample – those who offer to participate; Snowball sample – asking someone to identify someone else, who then identifies someone else; Partial sample – percent of total, random sample of total, particular partial example that meets a particular guideline.

D.      Questionnaire or measures are you using?

a.       If you are using something someone else designed (scales or survey questions) how do you know about reliability (how has it been tested/developed)  Justify this measure over others – answer the why question (Why this one?)

b.      If YOU are creating the measure

                                                               i.      Why are you developing a new measure (the purpose that it serves – which could be as there is no current way to measure this item.)

                                                             ii.      How did you choose to develop the parts and pieces – did you take elements from other interviews or surveys and put them together?

                                                            iii.      What type of format will you use? Qual survey versus interview, document versus face-to-face.

                                                           iv.      How will you assess reliability? Reliability checking with another person – data checking… looking for consistency in triangulated methods.

E.       Methods or techniques used

a.       What are the variables (the items of study)

b.      How are you going to control for other outside variables?





The Basics

In the simplest terms, a formal analysis is an analysis

of any artwork in terms of its formal qualities.  

This type of analysis will identify different forms and elements 

the artist used; however, it goes beyond just listing these aspects.  

It describes the artist’s use of varying elements (line, color, space, and/or texture) and interprets the meaning behind those elements.  

Keep in mind that not every art element or design principle will apply to every 

piece of art! A well-written formal analysis should include the following three items:  identification of the formal elements and/or design principles used

clear and elaborative descriptions of the identified elements

explanation of the effect the elements have on the overall work of art

****The Four Parts of Analysis***

1.DESCRIPTION–defining and describing the work of art using art elements and 

the principles of design.“What do you see?”

a.Basic Facts (artist’s name, medium, title, date, location, condition)

b.Art Elements (line, shape, light, color, texture, space)